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Abstract—We present a comprehensive analysis on connectivity
and resilience of secure sensor networks under the widely studied
q-composite key predistribution scheme. For network connectiv-
ity which ensures that any two sensors can find a path in between
for secure communication, we derive the conditions to guarantee
connectivity in consideration of (i) node-capture attacks, where
the adversary may capture a set of sensors and compromise
keys in their memory; (ii) sensor mobility, meaning that sensors
can move around so that the network topology may change
over time; (iii) physical transmission constraints, under which
two sensors have to be within each other’s transmission range
for communication; (iv) the boundary effect of network fields;
and (v) link unreliability, meaning that links are allowed to be
unreliable. In contrast, many prior connectivity analyses of secure
sensor networks often ignore the above issues. For resilience,
although limited studies have presented formal analysis, it is often
assumed that the adversary captures a random set of sensors,
whereas this paper allows the adversary to capture an arbitrary
set of sensors. We present conditions to ensure unassailability and
unsplittability in secure sensor networks under the q-composite
scheme. Unassailability ensures that an adversary capturing any
set consisting of a negligible fraction of sensors can compromise
only a negligible fraction of communication links although
the adversary may compromise communications between non-
captured nodes which happen to use keys that are shared by
captured nodes. Unsplittability means that when a negligible
fraction of sensors are captured, almost all of the remaining nodes
are still securely connected. Based on the results of connectivity,
unassailability and unsplittability, we provide useful guidelines
for the design of secure sensor networks.
Index Terms—Security, key predistribution, wireless sensor
networks, connectivity, random graphs.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
Random key predistribution schemes have been widely
recognized as appropriate solutions to secure communications
in resource-constrained wireless sensor networks [1]–[6]. The
idea of randomly assigning cryptographic keys to sensors
before deployment was proposed in the seminal work of Es-
chenauer and Gligor [2]. The Eschenauer–Gligor (EG) scheme
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[2] works as follows. To secure a sensor network with n nodes,
in the key predistribution phase, the scheme uses a large key
pool comprising Pn cryptographic keys to select Kn distinct
keys uniformly at random for each sensor. These Kn keys
form the key ring of a sensor, and are inserted into the sensor’s
memory. After sensors are deployed, two sensors can securely
communicate over an existing link if and only if their key rings
share at least one key. Common keys are found via neighbor
discovery strategies [2]. We let Pn and Kn be functions of n
for generality, with the natural condition 1 ≤ Kn ≤ Pn.
Based on the EG scheme [2], Chan et al. [1] propose the
q-composite key predistribution scheme as an extension. In
such q-composite scheme, two sensors establish a secure link
in between if and only if their key rings have at least q key(s)
in common, where 1 ≤ q ≤ Kn. Obviously, the q-composite
scheme with q = 1 is the same as the EG scheme. The q-
composite scheme with q ≥ 2 performs better than the EG
scheme in terms of resilience against small-scale node-capture
attacks while trading off heightened vulnerability in the pres-
ence of large-scale node-capture attacks. The q-composite
scheme has been widely investigated in the literature over the
last decade [7]–[13].
For wireless sensor networks with probabilistic key pre-
distribution, due to the analytical complexity, most work in
the literature on connectivity and resilience (explained below)
considers only static networks with few exceptions. In this
paper, we consider mobile networks in addition to static
networks. An example application of probabilistic key pre-
distribution to mobile networks beyond static sensor networks
is frequency hopping [14], which is a classic approach for
transmitting wireless signals by switching a carrier among
different frequency channels. In this application, each node
uniformly and independently selects Kn secret seeds out of
a secret pool consisting of Pn secret seeds, and two nodes
communicate with each other via frequency hopping only if
they share at least certain number of secret seeds.
Although random key predistribution schemes enable secure
communications in wireless sensor networks, they are often
not explicitly designed to defend against node-capture attacks,
which sensor networks deployed in hostile environments are
often subject to. The resilience of random key predistribution
schemes to node-capture attacks is often analyzed informally,
and existing results are often obtained under full visibility
without addressing physical transmission constraints, where
the full visibility model assumes that any two sensors have a
direct communication link in between. We present results on
the resilience of the q-composite scheme not only under full
visibility, but also under physical transmission constraints in
which two nodes have to be within a certain distance from
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each other to communicate.
A metric proposed by Chan et al. [1] to address the
resilience to node-capture attacks is the probability (denoted
by pcompromised) that capturing nodes enables an adversary
to compromise communications between non-captured nodes.
Such probability pcompromised is non-zero in the EG scheme
and its q-composite version because non-captured nodes may
happen to use keys that are also shared by captured nodes [15],
[16]. Clearly, a random key predistribution scheme is perfectly
resilient to sensor-capture attacks if pcompromised is alway zero.
This implies that only communications between a captured
node and its direct neighbors are compromised in a perfectly
resilient scheme.
The EG scheme and its q-composite version can be easily
extended to become perfectly resilient in the Chan et al. [1]
sense [17], [18]. For instance, after the neighbor discovery
phase of the EG scheme ends, in case that two neighboring
nodes identified by IDa and IDb discover that they share key
kab, they can each use a cryptographic hash function hash(·)
to compute a new shared key Kab = hash(IDa||IDb||kab) for
a < b, and erase the old key kab. Since Kab is statistically
unique up to the birthday bounds, the EG scheme becomes
perfectly resilient. Similarly, the q-composite scheme can
become perfectly resilient if the hash operation includes the
uniquely ordered q keys instead of the single key kab.
In mobile sensor networks employing the EG scheme or
its q-composite version, the key hashing process above is not
applicable, since sensors’ neighbor sets change over time as
sensors move around. In static sensor networks with the key
hashing process, there is still a neighbor discovery phase where
perfect resilience cannot hold. Therefore, it is of interest and
significance to analyze the resilience of q-composite scheme.
In addition to analyzing the resilience of the q-composite
scheme, we also investigate connectivity properties of secure
sensor networks under the q-composite scheme, when the
adversary may capture a set of sensors. Connectivity means
that any two sensors can find a path in between for secure
communication. Our connectivity analysis considers many
different settings: the network can be static or mobile; we
consider the case of no node capture as well as the case
of node-capture attacks; limited visibility models considered
include the disk model, the link unreliability model, and their
combination; under the disk model, we consider both the case
ignoring the boundary effect of the network fields as well as
the case considering the boundary effect.
B. Problems
1) Connectivity:
Connectivity is a fundamental property that networks are
often designed to have.
Definition of Connectivity. A network is connected if each
node can find at least one path to reach another node.
For secure sensor networks with the q-composite scheme,
we obtain the conditions to have the networks connected; i.e.,
the conditions that any two sensors can find a path in between
for secure communication.
2) Unsplittability:
Another metric to characterize resiliency is unsplittability
proposed by Pietro et al. [16]. The motivation is that even if
a negligible (i.e., o(1))1 fraction of nodes are compromised,
almost all of the remaining nodes are still securely connected.
Formally, unsplittability is defined as follows.
Definition of Unsplittability. A secure sensor network is
unsplittable if with high probability an adversary that has
captured an arbitrary set of o(n) sensors cannot partition
the network into two chunks, which both have linear sizes of
sensors (i.e., Θ(n) sensors), and either are isolated from each
other or only have compromised communications in between
(i.e., keys used for communications between the two chucks
are all compromised by the adversary).
From the definition above, for a unsplittable secure sensor
network, even if n1 = o(n) nodes are compromised, we still
have a securely connected network consisting of n−n2 nodes,
where n2 can also be written as o(n) despite n2 ≥ n1.
The reason for n2 ≥ n1 is that capturing nodes enables
an adversary to compromise communications between non-
captured nodes which happen to use keys that are also shared
by captured nodes.
For secure sensor networks with the q-composite scheme,
we explore the conditions to have the networks unsplittable.
3) Unassailability:
We borrow the notion of unassailability by Mei et al.
[19] and present the following definition. Briefly, a secure
sensor network is unassailable if pcompromised is o(1) after the
adversary has captured o(n) sensors.
Definition of Unassailability. A secure sensor network is
unassailable if an adversary that has captured an arbitrary
set of o(n) sensors can only compromise o(1) fraction of
communication links in the rest of the network; in other words,
an adversary has to capture a constant fraction of sensors to
compromise a constant fraction of communication links.
For secure sensor networks with the q-composite scheme,
we derive the conditions to have the networks unassailable.
Many prior studies have analyzed node-captured attacks,
but they often consider that the adversary randomly capture
sensors. However, in practice, the adversary may tune its node-
capture strategy according to its goals. To analyze unassailabil-
ity, we analyze arbitrary node-capture attacks, in which the
adversary can capture an arbitrary set of sensors. The choice
of the captured nodes depends on the adversary’s goal and
also physical limitations (e.g., some sensors may be easier to
be captured than others).
1All limits are taken with n → ∞, where n is the number of nodes in a
network. The standard asymptotic notation o(·), O(·), ω(·),Ω(·),Θ(·),∼ are
used. Given two positive sequences fn and gn, we have
1) fn = o (gn) means limn→∞
fn
gn
= 0.
2) fn = O (gn) means that there exist positive constants c1 and N1 such
that fn ≤ c1gn for all n ≥ N1.
3) fn = ω (gn) means limn→∞
fn
gn
=∞.
4) fn = Ω (gn) means that there exist positive constants c2 and N2 such
that fn ≥ c2gn for all n ≥ N2.
5) fn = Θ(gn) means that there exist positive constants c3, c4 and N3
such that c3gn ≤ fn ≤ c4gn for all n ≥ N3.
6) fn ∼ gn means that limn→∞
fn
gn
= 1; i.e., fn and gn are asymptoti-
cally equivalent.
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Symbols Meanings
Pn the size of the key pool
Kn the number of keys assigned to each sensor before deployment
q
the minimum number of keys that two sensors need to share
for secure communication over an existing link
rn
the distance that two sensors have to be within each other
for communication under the disk model
tn
the probability that each link is active when links are
allowed to be unreliable
TABLE I
SYMBOLS AND THEIR MEANINGS.
C. Contributions
Our work presents a rigorous and comprehensive analysis
on resilience and connectivity of secure sensor networks under
the q-composite key scheme. In particular, we investigate con-
ditions to have unassailability and unsplittability. For network
connectivity, we derive the conditions to guarantee connec-
tivity in consideration of (i) node-capture attacks, where the
adversary may capture a set of sensors and compromise keys
in their memory; (ii) sensor mobility, meaning that sensors
can move around so that the network topology may change
over time; (iii) physical transmission constraints, under which
two sensors have to be within each other’s transmission range
for communication; (iv) the boundary effect of network fields;
and (v) link unreliability, meaning that links are allowed to be
unreliable.
Summary of Results.We summarize our results as follows.
Note that all results are in the asymptotic sense.
• Connectivity: We establish the following results for con-
nectivity in secure sensor networks employing the q-
composite scheme. Note that rn denotes the distance that
two sensors have to be within each other for communica-
tion under the disk model, and tn denotes the probability
that each link is active when links are allowed to be
unreliable.
Connectivity of static networks:
– A static secure sensor network with the q-composite
scheme under the disk model on the unit torus without
the boundary effect is connected if 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
·πrn2 ≥
c lnn
n for any constant c > 1.
– A static secure sensor network with the q-composite
scheme and unreliable links under the disk model on
the unit torus without the boundary effect is connected
if 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
·πrn2 · tn ≥ c lnnn for any constant c > 1.
– A static secure sensor network with the q-
composite scheme under the disk model on the
unit square with the boundary effect is connected if
1
q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn2≥ c lnnn for any constant c > c∗n :=
max{1 + ln Pn
Kn2
/
lnn, 4 ln Pn
Kn2
/
lnn}.
– A static secure sensor network with the q-composite
scheme and unreliable links under the disk model on
the unit square with the boundary effect is connected
if 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn2 · tn ≥ c lnnn for any constant c >
c#n := max{1+(q ln PnKn2 +ln
1
tn
)
/
lnn, 4(q ln Pn
Kn2
+
ln 1tn )
/
lnn}.
Connectivity of mobile networks:
– A mobile secure sensor network with the q-composite
scheme under the disk model on the unit torus without
the boundary effect and under the i.i.d. mobility model
is connected for at least nc−1−ǫ consecutive time slots
from the beginning for an arbitrary positive constant
ǫ, if 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn2 ≥ c lnnn for any constant c > 1.
– A mobile secure sensor network with the q-composite
scheme and unreliable links under the disk model on
the unit torus without the boundary effect and under
the i.i.d. mobility model is connected for at least
nc−1−ǫ consecutive time slots from the beginning for
an arbitrary positive constant ǫ, if 1q! ·Kn
2q
Pnq
·πrn2 ·tn ≥
c lnn
n for any constant c > 1.
– A mobile secure sensor network with the q-composite
scheme under the disk model on the unit square
with the boundary effect and under the i.i.d. mobility
model is connected for at least nc−c
∗
n−ǫ consecutive
time slots from the beginning for an arbitrary positive
constant ǫ, if 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
·πrn2 ≥ c lnnn for any constant
c > c∗n with c
∗
n defined above.
– A mobile secure sensor network with the q-composite
scheme and unreliable links under the disk model on
the unit square with the boundary effect and under the
i.i.d. mobility model is connected for at least nc−c#−ǫ
consecutive time slots from the beginning for an arbi-
trary positive constant ǫ, if 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
·πrn2 ·tn ≥ c lnnn
for any constant c > c#n with c
#
n defined above.
Connectivity under node capture: To obtain the connec-
tivity results for an n-size network after the adversary has
captured a random set of m nodes out of all n nodes, we
just replace lnn with ln(n−m), lnnn with ln(n−m)n−m , and n
with (n−m) in the above connectivity results (note that
we do not replace the “n” in Kn, Pn, rn, tn).
• Unassailability:
– A secure sensor network with the q-composite scheme
under any communication model is unassailable if
Pn/Kn = Ω(n).
• Unsplittability:
– A secure sensor network with the q-composite scheme
under full visibility is unsplittable if 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
≥ c lnnn
for any constant c > 1, Kn = ω(lnn) and Kn =
o
(
min{√Pn, Pnn }
)
.
– A static secure sensor network with the q-composite
scheme under the disk model on some area A is
splittable if rn = o(
√A).
D. Roadmap
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
reviews related work. In Section III, we describe the system
model. Section IV presents the main results. We provide
several useful lemmas in Section V. Afterwards, we establish
the theorems in Section VI. We explain simulation results in
Section VII. Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper.
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II. RELATED WORK
Unassailability. Mei et al. [19] introduce the notion of
unassailability. However, their work is different from ours in
the following aspects: they address the EG scheme whereas we
consider the more general q-composite scheme; they assume
that the adversary knows the key rings of all nodes whereas
we do not have such assumption; they enforce the strong
assumption that whenever the adversary has compromised one
shared key between two sensors, the secure link between the
two sensors is compromised even though that compromised
key is not used for the secure link. For the EG scheme, Di
Pietro et al. [15], [16] have presented conditions to ensure
that an adversary has to capture a constant fraction of sensors
in order to compromise a constant fraction of communication
links. Similar results for the q-composite scheme have been
obtained by Zhao [17], [18]. However, the difference between
[15]–[18] and this paper is that [15]–[18] consider an adver-
sary randomly capturing sensors, while this paper investigates
the more practical case of arbitrary node-capture attacks, in
which the adversary can capture an arbitrary set of sensors. In
addition to the EG scheme and the q-composite scheme, the
random pairwise key predistribution scheme of Chan et al.
[1] has also received much attention. The unassailability of
the pairwise scheme has recently been studied by Yag˘an and
Makowski [20]. The key predistribution schemes by Liu and
Ning [12] and Du et al. [3] exhibit the threshold behavior in
terms of resilience against node-capture attacks. Techniques to
improve the resilience against node capture have been studied
in [21]–[26].
Unsplittability. For the EG scheme, its unsplittability has
been studied by [16]. Note that our unsplittability result is
for the more general q-composite scheme. Yet, even when
we apply our general result to the EG scheme, the obtained
result will be stronger than that of [16]. Specifically, since
our unsplittability condition for the q-composite scheme uses
1
q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
≥ c lnnn for a constant c > 1, our unsplittability
result applying to the EG scheme (i.e., the q-composite scheme
with q = 1) uses Kn
2
Pn
≥ c lnnn for a constant c > 1. In
contrast, the unsplittability result of the EG scheme in [16]
requires Kn
2
Pn
≥ c lnnn for a constant c > 17. For the random
pairwise key predistribution scheme of Chan et al. [1], Yag˘an
and Makowski [20] have recently studied its unsplittability.
Connectivity. Although connectivity of secure sensor net-
works has been widely investigated in the literature, many
prior studies has one or more than one of the following
limitations: much research [1], [4], [6] ignores either real-
world transmission constraints between sensors or mobility
of sensors because analyzing the key predistribution scheme,
transmission constraints, and node mobility together makes
the analysis very challenging; several researches considering
transmission constraints obtain quite weak results [10], [27]–
[29] or apply to limited settings [17] (e.g., the case ignoring
the boundary effect of the network fields); the proof techniques
[30] lack formality. Below we discuss some related work in
detail.
For a secure sensor network with the q-composite scheme
under the full visibility, its connectivity has been studied in
[10], [30], while its k-connectivity has been considered in [29],
where k-connectivity ensures connectivity despite the failure
of any k−1 nodes [31], [32]. However, the proof techniques in
[30] lack formality (specifically [30, Equation (6.93)]) and are
different from those in this paper. The results of connectivity
in [29] and k-connectivity in [10] address only the narrow
and impractical range of Pn = o
(
n
1
q (lnn)−
3
5q
)
, as explained
below. In contrast, from condition set Λ in (6), our Theorem
1 considers a more practical range of Pn = ω(n lnn). We
present more details below.
We explain that the result of [10] for connectivity is not
applicable to practical sensor networks, whereas our result is
applicable. The limitation of [10] is that both Kn and Pn are
required to be quite small in [10] so they will not satisfy the
resiliency requirement PnKn = Ω(n). More specifically, [10,
Equation (2)] enforces[
(q + 2)
(
Kn
q
)5
(ln lnn)2
] 3Kn−q
3(Kn−q)
≤ (lnn)1−γ
for a constant γ ∈ (0, 1), (1)
where the notation s and d in [10] correspond to q and Kn
here.
In (1), the exponent 3Kn−q3(Kn−q) is greater than 1 givenKn > q,
since q is a constant and does not scale with n (q is often
less than 10), while Kn controls the number of keys on
each sensor and is at least a two-digit number for a network
comprising thousands of sensors. In fact, if Kn < q, the q-
composite scheme is meaningless because each sensor has just
Kn keys so it is impossible for two sensors to share q keys
if Kn < q. Furthermore, in (1), the base is greater than 1 for
all sufficiently large owing to limn→∞ ln lnn =∞. Given the
above, we can cancel out the exponent in (1); i.e., (1) implies
(q + 2)
(
Kn
q
)5
(ln lnn)2 ≤ (lnn)1−γ
for a constant γ ∈ (0, 1). (2)
In view of
(
Kn
q
)
= 1q!
∏q−1
i=0 (Kn − i) ≥ 1q! (Kn − q)q , we use
(2) to derive
Kn ≤ q + q
√
q! · 5q
√
1
q + 2
· (lnn)
1−γ
(ln lnn)2
for a constant γ ∈ (0, 1), (3)
which along with the fact that q is a constant further induces
Kn = O
(
5q
√
(lnn)1−γ
(ln lnn)2
)
= o
(
(lnn)
1
5q
)
. (4)
To ensure connectivity of a secure sensor network resulted
from the q-composite key predistribution scheme, with pq
denoting the edge probability, both [10] and our work obtain
that it is necessary to have pq = Ω
(
lnn
n
)
or equivalently
1
q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
= Ω
(
lnn
n
)
, since it holds that 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
is an
asymptotic expression of pq from (18) later. The requirement
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1
q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
= Ω
(
lnn
n
)
and the condition (4) derived from [10]
together imply
Pn =
Kn
2
q
√
q!× Ω( lnnn ) = o
(
n
1
q (lnn)−
3
5q
)
. (5)
However, we explain that (5) is not applicable to practical
sensor networks. This paper for general q and Di Pietro et al.
[15], [16] for q = 1 have both proved that the condition PnKn =
Ω(n) is needed to ensure reasonable network resiliency against
node-capture attacks in the sense that an adversary capturing
sensors at random has to obtain at least a constant fraction
of nodes of the network in order to compromise a constant
fraction of secure links. The condition PnKn = Ω(n) with Kn ≥
1 clearly implies Pn = Ω(n), which does not hold for any Pn
satisfying (5). Hence, we have explained that the result of [10]
cannot be used to design secure sensor networks in practice.
In contrast, from condition set Λ in (6), our theorems apply to
a more practical range of Pn = ω(n lnn). Hence, our results
apply to real-world secure sensor networks and provide useful
design guidelines.
For connectivity analysis of secure sensor networks tak-
ing into transmission constraints, for the EG scheme, Krzy-
wdzin´ski and Rybarczyk [28], and Krishnan et al. [27] recently
show upper bounds 8 lnnn and
2π lnn
n for the critical threshold
that the edge probability (i.e., the probability of a secure link
between two sensors) takes for connectivity, while [14] proves
the exact threshold as lnnn . For the q-composite scheme with
general q, [17] has presented connectivity results under trans-
mission constraints. However, the following issues addressed
in this paper are not tackled by [17]: the boundary effect of
the network fields, the mobility of sensors, the combination
of link unreliability and the transmission constraints modeled
by the disk model (to be explained in Section III-A2). We
note that there are many connectivity studies [4], [5], [33]–
[36] considering only link unreliability without the disk model
(node mobility and node-capture attacks are not considered in
these references).
III. SYSTEM MODELS
All of our studied networks employ the q-composite
scheme. Clearly, our analysis also applies to the basic
Eschenauer–Gligor scheme which has q = 1. We first discuss
the communication models and mobility, and then detail the
studied networks.
A. Communication Models
We consider the following communication models.
1) Full Visibility:
The full visibility model assumes that any two sensors have
a direct communication link in between. Under such model,
a secure link exists between two sensors if and only if they
share at least q keys.
2) Disk Model:
In the disk model, each node’s transmission area is a disk
with a transmission radius rn, with rn being a function of n
for generality. Two nodes have to be within rn (their distance
is at most rn) for direct communication. As for the node
distribution, the same as much previous work [27], [28], [37],
[38], we consider that the n nodes are independently and
uniformly deployed in some network region A. We let the
region A be either a torus T or a square S, each with a unit
area. The unit torus T eliminates the boundary effect (a node
on T “exits” the area from one side appears as reentering from
the opposite side). The boundary effect of the unit square S is
that a circle with radius rn centered a point near the boundary
of S may have a part falling outside of S, so a node close
to one side and another node close to the opposite side may
not have an edge in between on the square S, but may have
an edge in between on the torus T because of wrap-around
connections of torus topology.
3) Link Unreliability:
Communication links between nodes may not be available
due to the presence of physical barriers between nodes or
because of harsh environmental conditions severely impairing
transmission. To model unreliable links, each link is either
active with probability tn or inactive with probability (1−tn),
where tn is a function of n for generality.
Table I summarizes the symbols and their meanings.
B. Mobility
In addition to static sensor networks, we also consider
mobile sensor networks which are initialized in the same way
as static sensor networks. After initialization, sensors may
move around. On either the torus or the square, we consider
the i.i.d. mobility model, where each node independently picks
a new location uniformly at random at the beginning of a time
slot and stays at the location in the rest of the time slot. This
i.i.d. mobility model clearly yields a uniform node distribution
at each time slot. For each mobile network that we consider,
given a uniform node distribution at each time slot, we can
view the mobile network at a single time slot as an instance of
the corresponding static network. A future work is to consider
other mobility models [39]–[42].
C. Studied Networks
We summarize our studied networks in Table II. As pre-
sented, we consider the following nine secure sensor networks:
• a secure sensor network with the q-composite scheme
under full visibility (the network can be either static or
mobile),
• a static secure sensor network with the q-composite
scheme under the disk model on the unit torus without
the boundary effect,
• a static secure sensor network with the q-composite
scheme under the disk model on the unit square with the
boundary effect,
• a static secure sensor network with the q-composite
scheme and unreliable links under the disk model on the
unit torus without the boundary effect,
• a static secure sensor network with the q-composite
scheme and unreliable links under the disk model on the
unit square with the boundary effect,
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Settings Notation for networks
full visibility
(static/mobile secure sensor networks)
networkfull visibility
static
secure
sensor
networks
disk model
torus static-networkdisk modelunit torus
square static-networkdisk modelunit square
disk model w/
unreliable links
torus static-network
disk model
unit torus
unreliable links
square static-network
disk model
unit square
unreliable links
mobile
secure
sensor
networks
disk model
torus mobile-networkdisk modelunit torus
square mobile-networkdisk modelunit square
disk model w/
unreliable links
torus mobile-network
disk model
unit torus
unreliable links
square mobile-network
disk model
unit square
unreliable links
TABLE II
THE STUDIED SECURE SENSOR NETWORKS AND THEIR NOTATION, WHERE
“W/” IS SHORT FOR “WITH”. ALL NETWORKS EMPLOY THE q-COMPOSITE
RANDOM KEY PREDISTRIBUTION SCHEME.
• a mobile secure sensor network with the q-composite
scheme under the disk model on the unit torus without
the boundary effect,
• a mobile secure sensor network with the q-composite
scheme under the disk model on the unit square with the
boundary effect,
• a mobile secure sensor network with the q-composite
scheme and unreliable links under the disk model on the
unit torus without the boundary effect, and
• a mobile secure sensor network with the q-composite
scheme and unreliable links under the disk model on the
unit square with the boundary effect.
Throughout the paper, q is an arbitrary positive integer and
does not scale with n, the number of nodes in the sensor
network. In addition, ln is the natural logarithm function, the
base of which is e.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
We present the main results below.
A. Connectivity of Secure Sensor Networks
We establish connectivity results for the nine settings of
secure sensor networks in Table II. A network is connected if
each node can find at least one path to securely communicate
with another node. The results are summarized in Table III,
and they will be presented as theorems in detail.
All results given in Table III rely a set Λ of conditions,
defined as follows:
Condition set Λ :

Kn= ω(lnn),
Kn= o
(
min
{√
Pn,
Pn
n
})
,
rn = o(1).
(6)
We explain that all conditions in set Λ are practical. Note
that Kn is the number of keys assigned to each sensor before
deployment. In real-world implementations,Kn is often larger
[4], [8] than lnn, so Kn = ω(lnn) follows. As concrete ex-
amples, we have ln 1000 ≈ 6.9, ln 5000 ≈ 8.5 and ln 10000 ≈
9.2. Since Kn is much smaller compared to both n and Pn
due to constrained memory and computational resources of
sensors [1], [2], [4], then Kn
2
Pn
= o(1) and KnPn = o
(
1
n
)
are practical, yielding Kn = o
(
min{√Pn, Pnn }
)
. Note that
Kn = ω(lnn) and Kn = o
(
min{√Pn, Pnn }
)
together imply
Pn = ω(n lnn), which is also practical since Pn is larger than
n [1], [2], [16]. As examples, we have 1000 ln1000 ≈ 6907,
5000 ln5000 ≈ 42585 and 10000 ln10000 ≈ 92103. Finally,
because we consider a unit area of network region and there
are n nodes in this region, the condition rn = o(1) is also
practical.
To look at the conditions related to lnnn in Table III, we first
explain that for each network in Table III, the left hand side
of each condition related to lnnn in the result is asymptotically
equivalent to the edge probability of the network, where the
edge probability is the probability that two nodes have an
edge in between for direct communication, and is defined
for each time slot for mobile networks (note that all nodes
are symmetric in each network). Specifically, we have the
following under condition set Λ:
①
1
q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
is asymptotically equivalent to the edge proba-
bility of networkfull visibility,
②
1
q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn2 is a common asymptotic value of the
edge probabilities of networks static-networkdisk modelunit torus ,
static-networkdisk modelunit square, mobile-network
disk model
unit torus , and
mobile-networkdisk modelunit square, and
③
1
q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn2 · tn is a common asymptotic value
of the edge probabilities of static-network
disk model
unit torus
unreliable links,
static-network
disk model
unit square
unreliable links, mobile-network
disk model
unit torus
unreliable links, and
mobile-network
disk model
unit square
unreliable links.
Before explaining the above results ①–③, we first present
a useful result (i.e., Lemma 1) and its proof.
Lemma 1. Let µn(A) be the probability that two nodes are
within distance rn when they are independently and uniformly
distributed in a network region A. Then we have:
• When A is a torus T of unit area, µn(A) becomes µn(T ),
which is given by
µn(T ) = πrn2, for rn ≤ 12 . (7)
• When A is a square S of unit area, µn(A) becomes
µn(S), which satisfies
(1− 2rn)2 · πrn2 ≤ µn(S) ≤ πrn2, for rn ≤ 12 , (8)
and
µn(S) ∼ πrn2, for rn = o(1), (9)
where µn(S) ∼ πrn2 means limn→∞ µn(S)πrn2 = 1 (i.e., µn(S)
is asymptotically equivalent to πrn
2), and rn = o(1) means
limn→∞ rn = 0.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Our goal is to analyze µn(A), which denotes the probability
that two nodes are within distance rn when they are indepen-
dently and uniformly deployed in a network region A. We let
vx and vy denote the two nodes, and write their distance as
distance(vx, vy).
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static/mobile secure sensor networks
under full visibility
connected if 1
q!
· Kn
2q
Pnq
≥ c lnn
n
for any constant c > 1
static
secure
sensor
networks
disk model
torus connected if 1
q!
· Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn
2 ≥ c lnn
n
for any constant c > 1
square connected if 1
q!
· Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn
2 ≥ c lnn
n
for any constant c > c∗n
disk model w/
unreliable links
torus connected if 1
q!
·
Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn
2 · tn ≥
c lnn
n
for any constant c > 1
square connected if 1
q!
· Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn
2 · tn ≥
c lnn
n
for any constant c > c
#
n
mobile
secure
sensor
networks
disk model
torus connected for at least nc−1−ǫ consecutive time slots if 1
q!
·
Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn
2 ≥ c lnn
n
for any constant c > 1
square connected for at least nc−c
∗
n−ǫ consecutive time slots if 1
q!
· Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn
2 ≥ c lnn
n
for any constant c > c∗n
disk model w/
unreliable links
torus connected for at least nc−1−ǫ consecutive time slots if 1
q!
· Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn
2 · tn ≥
c lnn
n
for any constant c > 1
square connected for at least nc−c
#
n−ǫ consecutive time slots if 1
q!
·
Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn
2 · tn ≥
c lnn
n
for any constant c > c
#
n
TABLE III
DIFFERENT SETTINGS OF SECURE SENSOR NETWORKS AND THEIR CONNECTIVITY RESULTS, WHERE “W/” IS SHORT FOR “WITH”. NOTE THAT c∗n IS
max
{
1 +
(
ln Pn
Kn2
)/
lnn, 4
(
ln Pn
Kn2
)/
lnn
}
, c
#
n IS c
#
n IS max
{
1 +
(
q ln Pn
Kn2
+ ln 1
tn
)/
lnn, 4
(
q ln Pn
Kn2
+ ln 1
tn
)/
lnn
}
, AND ǫ IS AN
ARBITRARY POSITIVE CONSTANT. ALL RESULTS ARE IN THE ASYMPTOTIC SENSE TO HOLD WITH HIGH PROBABILITY, AND THUS THE CONDITIONS IN
THE TABLE ONLY NEED TO HOLD FOR ALL n SUFFICIENTLY LARGE. EXCEPT THE RESULT UNDER FULL VISIBILITY WHICH REQUIRES CONDITIONS ONKn
AND Pn IN CONDITION SET Λ IN (6) ON PAGE 6 BUT NOT THE CONDITION rn = o(1) IN Λ, ALL OTHER RESULTS NEED THE WHOLE CONDITION SET Λ.
Proving (7) for µn(T ) on the unit torus T : We consider
the case of the unit torus T here. Note that µn(T ) means
P [distance(vx, vy) ≤ rn] when nodes vx and vy are indepen-
dently and uniformly deployed in the unit torus T . Given any
location of node vx, the event distance(vx, vy) ≤ rn happens
if and only if the random position of node vy is located in the
circle centered at node vx’s position with a radius of rn; this
clearly happens with probability πrn
2 since the above circle
is completely inside the torus T due to the following three
reasons:
• we consider rn ≤ 12 in (7);
• the torus T has no boundary (if we think the torus as a
square, then a point “exits” the torus area from one side
appears as reentering from the opposite side),
• the circle centered at node vx’s position with a radius of
rn has an area of πrn
2, and the torus T has an unit area.
Therefore, given any location of vx, the event
distance(vx, vy) ≤ rn on the unit torus T occurs with
probability πrn
2 when node vy is uniformly deployed
in the unit torus T . Now we consider that node vx is
also uniformly distributed in the unit torus T , and clearly
distance(vx, vy) ≤ rn still happens with probability πrn2.
Hence, we have proved µn(T ) = πrn2, for rn ≤ 12 ; i.e., (7)
holds.
Proving (8) for µn(S) on the unit square S: We consider
the case of the unit square S here. Note that µn(S) means
P [distance(vx, vy) ≤ rn] when nodes vx and vy are indepen-
dently and uniformly deployed in the unit torus S. Given any
location of vx, the event distance(vx, vy) ≤ rn happens if and
only if the random position of node vy is located in the circle
centered at node vx’s position with a radius of rn.
We let C denote the center of the unit square S. Then for
rn ≤ 12 , we define Z as a square centered at C with side
length 1−2rn, as illustrated in Figure 1. If node vx’s location
is inside Z , we denote it by vx ∈ Z .
On the one hand, whenever vx ∈ Z , the circle centered at
node vx’s position with a radius of rn is completely inside
the square S, as shown in Figure 1, so the random position of
node vy belongs to this circle with probability πrn
2. Hence,
given any location of vx which is inside Z , the conditional
probability that vx and vy is πrn
2, when we consider the
uniform distribution of vy’s position. Then the conditional
probability of distance(vx, vy) ≤ rn given vx ∈ Z is πrn2,
for rn ≤ 12 . Formally, we obtain
P
[(
distance(vx, vy) ≤ rn
)
| (vx ∈ Z)
]
= πrn
2, for rn ≤ 12 .
(10)
On the other hand, whenever vx 6∈ Z , the circle centered
at node vx’s position with a radius of rn may or may not be
completely inside the square S, so the probability that the
random position of node vy belongs to the intersection of
this circle and the square S is no greater than πrn2. Hence,
given any location of vx which is outside of Z , the conditional
probability that vx and vy is at most πrn
2, when we consider
the uniform distribution of vy’s position. Then the conditional
probability of distance(vx, vy) ≤ rn given vx 6∈ Z is no
greater than πrn
2, for rn ≤ 12 . Formally, we have
P
[(
distance(vx, vy) ≤ rn
)
| (vx 6∈ Z)
] ≤ πrn2, for rn ≤ 12 .
(11)
Recall that µn(S) denotes distance(vx, vy) ≤ rn on the unit
square S. Clearly, from the law of total probability, we derive
µn(S)
= P [distance(vx, vy) ≤ rn]
= P
[(
distance(vx, vy) ≤ rn
)∩ (vx ∈ Z)]
+ P
[(
distance(vx, vy) ≤ rn
)∩ (vx 6∈ Z)]
= P
[(
distance(vx, vy) ≤ rn
)
| (vx ∈ Z)
]× P [vx ∈ Z]
+ P
[(
distance(vx, vy) ≤ rn
)
| (vx 6∈ Z)
]× P [vx 6∈ Z] .
(12)
Ignoring the term after the plus sign in (12), we further have
µn(S) ≥ P
[(
distance(vx, vy) ≤ rn
)
| (vx ∈ Z)
]× P [vx ∈ Z] .
(13)
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Fig. 1. For the position of a node vx satisfying the condition that vx’s distance to each edge of the unit square is at least rn with rn ≤
1
2
, given the position
of vx, the conditional probability that another node vy falls in vx’s transmission area is πrn
2, since the circle centered at node vx’s position with a radius
of rn is completely inside the square.
Note that vx is uniformly distributed on the square S, whose
area denoted by |S| is given by |S| = 1. The square Z has
a side length of 1 − 2rn, so its area denoted by |Z| equals
|Z| = (1− 2rn)2. Hence, we obtain
P [vx ∈ Z] = |Z||S| =
(1− 2rn)2
1
= (1 − 2rn)2, for rn ≤ 12 ,
(14)
and
P [vx 6∈ Z] = 1− P [vx ∈ Z] = 1− (1− 2rn)2, for rn ≤ 12 .
(15)
Using (10) and (14) in (13), we get
µn(S) ≥ πrn2 × (1 − 2rn)2, for rn ≤ 12 . (16)
Applying (10) (11) (14) and (15) to (12), we establish
µn(S) ≤ πrn2 × (1 − 2rn)2 + πrn2 × [1− (1 − 2rn)2]
≤ πrn2, for rn ≤ 12 . (17)
Summarizing (16) and (17), we have (1 − 2rn)2 · πrn2 ≤
µn(S) ≤ πrn2, for rn ≤ 12 ; i.e., (8) is proved.
Proving (9) for µn(S) on the unit square S: Recall that
for two positive sequences xn and yn, the relation xn ∼ yn
means limn→∞ xnyn = 1. From (8), it follows that (1−2rn)2 ≤
µn(S)
πrn2
≤ 1, for rn ≤ 12 . Clearly, given rn = o(1), we have
limn→∞(1 − 2rn)2 = 1 and also have rn ≤ 12 for all n
sufficiently large. Summarizing the above results, we clearly
obtain limn→∞
µn(S)
πrn2
= 1; i.e., µn(S) ∼ πrn2. Hence, (9) is
proved. 
We now show results ①–③ of Page 6.
We first show the above result ①. By [43, Lemma 1], if
Kn = ω(1) and Kn = o
(√
Pn
)
, then
pq ∼ 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
. (18)
The asymptotic equivalence (18) above holds for
networkfull visibility under condition set Λ in (6) on Page
6, since we have Kn = ω(1) and Kn = o
(√
Pn
)
from Λ.
We then explain the result ②. With µn(T ) (resp., µn(S))
denoting the probability that two nodes are within distance rn
when they are independently and uniformly distributed on the
unit torus T (resp., the unit square S), Lemma 1 above shows
µn(T ) = πrn2, for rn ≤ 12 , and µn(S) ∼ πrn2, for rn =
o(1). We can use Lemma 1 because our condition set Λ in (6)
on Page 6 has the condition rn = o(1), which implies rn ≤ 12
for all n sufficiently large. In words, Lemma 1 says that the
probability that two nodes are within distance rn is given by
πrn
2 on the unit torus T , and is asymptotically equivalent to
πrn
2 on the unit square S. In each of static-networkdisk modelunit torus
and static-networkdisk modelunit square, since two nodes have an edge in
between if and only if they are within distance rn and also
they share at least q keys, then under condition set Λ, the edge
probability is asymptotically equivalent to 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn2
from µn(T ) = πrn2, µn(S) ∼ πrn2 and pq ∼ 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
in (18). Furthermore, at each time slot, mobile networks
mobile-networkdisk modelunit torus and mobile-network
disk model
unit square can be
viewed as instances of static networks static-networkdisk modelunit torus
and static-networkdisk modelunit square, respectively. In view of the above,
the result ② is proved.
We now show the result ③. Compared with the networks in
the result ②, the networks in the result ③ also consider link
unreliability, in which each link is allowed to be inactive with
probability tn. Multiplying the term
1
q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn2 with tn,
we obtain 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
·πrn2 · tn, which is a common asymptotic
value of the edge probabilities of the networks in the result
③. Therefore, the result ③ follows.
We have shown the results ① ② and ③ on the asymptotic
values of the edge probabilities of the networks in Table III.
For each network in Table III, let ˜edge-prob denote the used
asymptotic value of its edge probability; namely, ˜edge-prob is
1
q! ·Kn
2q
Pnq
for networkfull visibility in the result ①, is 1q! ·Kn
2q
Pnq
·πrn2
for the four networks in the result ②, and is 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
·πrn2 ·tn
for the four networks in the result ③. As given in Table III,
the conditions related to lnnn can be summarized as follows.
For networkfull visibility and the four networks on the unit torus,
we have the condition that ˜edge-prob ≥ c lnnn for any constant
c > 1. For the four networks on the unit square, we have the
condition that ˜edge-prob ≥ c lnnn for any constant c > c˜n,
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where c˜n is given by
c˜n := max
{
1+
(
ln
[
( ˜edge-prob)−1
])/
lnn,
4
(
ln
[
( ˜edge-prob)−1
])/
lnn
}
=

1+
(
ln
[
( ˜edge-prob)−1
])/
lnn, if ˜edge-prob=Ω˜(n−1/3),
4
(
ln
[
( ˜edge-prob)−1
])/
lnn, if ˜edge-prob=O˜(n−1/3).
(19)
In (19) above, we write a quantity xn as Ω˜(n
α) for some
constant α if xn ≥ nα−ǫ1 for all n sufficiently large, where
ǫ1 is an arbitrary positive constant. Similarly, a quantity xn is
written as O˜(nα) for some constant α if xn ≤ nα+ǫ2 for all
n sufficiently large, where ǫ2 is an arbitrary positive constant.
The difference between the condition c > 1 for networks
on the torus, and the condition c > c˜n for networks on the
square is resulted from the boundary effect of the square.
From (19), we observe a phase transition of c˜n when
˜edge-prob or the edge probability asymptotically changes from
Ω˜(n−1/3) to O˜(n−1/3), or vice versa. The intuition is that to
compute the expected number of isolated nodes, in integrating
all possible points in unit square S with the boundary effect,
different areas on S contribute to the dominant part of the
integral depending on the edge probability, where a node is
non-isolated if it has a link with at least another node, and a
node is isolated if it has no link with any other node.
We now present the connectivity results in Table III as more
understandable theorems, which are all proved in Section VI.
We give first the results of secure sensor networks under full
visibility, then the results of static secure sensor networks, and
finally those of mobile secure sensor networks. As mentioned
before in Section III for the system model, all studied networks
employ the q-composite scheme.
1) Connectivity of Secure Sensor Networks with the q-
Composite Scheme under Full Visibility:
Theorem 1 below on connectivity is for the full visibility
case. Its proof is provided in Section VI-A.
Theorem 1 (Connectivity of networkfull visibility). Under con-
dition set Λ in (6) on Page 6, a secure sensor network with
the q-composite scheme under full visibility is connected with
high probability if 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
≥ c lnnn for all n sufficiently large,
where c is a constant with c > 1.
As explained in the result ① in Section IV-A, 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
is an
asymptotic value of the edge probability of networkfull visibility.
Although Theorem 1 can also be derived using the results
in [30], the proof techniques in [30] lack formality (specif-
ically [30, Equation (6.93)]) and are different from those
in this paper. In addition, Bloznelis and Rybarczyk [29]
(resp., Bloznelis and Łuczak [10]) have recently investigated
connectivity (resp., k-connectivity) of networkfull visibility, but
both results after a rewriting address only the narrow and
impractical range of Pn = o
(
n
1
q (lnn)−
3
5q
)
. In contrast, from
condition set Λ in (6), our Theorem 1 considers a more
practical range of Pn = ω(n lnn). More details can be found
in Section II for related work.
2) Connectivity of Static Secure Sensor Networks with the
q-Composite Scheme:
Theorems 2–5 present connectivity results of static secure
sensor networks. Their proofs are deferred to Section VI-B.
a) Connectivity under the Disk Model on the Torus
without the Boundary Effect:
Theorem 2 (Connectivity of static-networkdisk modelunit torus ). Under
condition set Λ in (6) on Page 6, a static secure sensor network
with the q-composite scheme under the disk model on the
unit torus without the boundary effect is connected with high
probability if 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn2 ≥ c lnnn for all n sufficiently
large, where c is a constant with c > 1.
As given in the result ② in Section IV-A, 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn2
is asymptotically equivalent to the edge probability of
static-networkdisk modelunit torus .
b) Connectivity with Unreliable Links under the Disk
Model on the Torus without the Boundary Effect:
Theorem 3 (Connectivity of static-network
disk model
unit torus
unreliable links). Un-
der condition set Λ in (6) on Page 6, a static secure sensor
network with the q-composite scheme and unreliable links un-
der the disk model on the unit torus without the boundary effect
is connected with high probability if 1q! ·Kn
2q
Pnq
·πrn2 ·tn ≥ c lnnn
for all n sufficiently large, where c is a constant with c > 1.
As explained in the result ③ in Section IV-A,
1
q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn2 · tn is an asymptotic value of the edge
probability of static-network
disk model
unit torus
unreliable links.
c) Connectivity under the Disk Model on the Square with
the Boundary Effect:
Theorem 4 (Connectivity of static-networkdisk modelunit square). Under
condition set Λ in (6) on Page 6, a static secure sensor network
with the q-composite scheme under the disk model on the
unit square with the boundary effect is connected with high
probability if 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn2 ≥ c lnnn for all n sufficiently
large, where c is some constant satisfying for all n sufficiently
large that
c > c∗n := max
{
1+
(
ln
Pn
Kn
2
)/
lnn, 4
(
ln
Pn
Kn
2
)/
lnn
}
.
(20)
As given in the result ② in Section IV-A, 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn2
is asymptotically equivalent to the edge probability of
static-networkdisk modelunit square.
d) Connectivity with Unreliable Links under the Disk
Model on the Square with the Boundary Effect:
Theorem 5 (Connectivity of static-network
disk model
unit square
unreliable links). Un-
der condition set Λ in (6) on Page 6, a static secure sensor
network with the q-composite scheme and unreliable links un-
der the disk model on the unit square with the boundary effect
is connected with high probability if 1q! ·Kn
2q
Pnq
·πrn2 ·tn ≥ c lnnn
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for all n sufficiently large, where c is some constant satisfying
for all n sufficiently large that
c > c#n := max
{
1 +
(
q ln
Pn
Kn
2 + ln
1
tn
)/
lnn,
4
(
q ln
Pn
Kn
2 + ln
1
tn
)/
lnn
}
. (21)
As explained in the result ③ in Section IV-A,
1
q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn2 · tn is an asymptotic value of the edge
probability of static-network
disk model
unit square
unreliable links.
3) Connectivity of Mobile Secure Sensor Networks with the
q-Composite Scheme:
Theorems 6–9 below present connectivity results of mobile
secure sensor networks. Their proofs are deferred to Section
VI-C. As explained in Section III for the system model, at each
time slot, each mobile network can be viewed as an instance of
its corresponding static network, and thus its edge probability
defined for each time slot also equals that of the corresponding
static network.
a) Connectivity under the Disk Model on the Torus
without the Boundary Effect:
Theorem 6 (Connectivity of mobile-networkdisk modelunit torus ). Under
condition set Λ in (6) on Page 6, a mobile secure sensor
network with the q-composite scheme under the disk model
on the unit torus without the boundary effect and under the
i.i.d. mobility model is connected with high probability for at
least nc−1−ǫ consecutive time slots from the beginning for an
arbitrary positive constant ǫ, if 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn2 ≥ c lnnn for
all n sufficiently large, where c is a constant with c > 1.
As given in the result ② in Section IV-A, 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn2
is asymptotically equivalent to the edge probability of
mobile-networkdisk modelunit torus . Also, from Theorem 2, the conditions
in Theorem 6 also ensure that the corresponding static network
static-networkdisk modelunit torus is connected with high probability.
b) Connectivity with Unreliable Links under the Disk
Model on the Torus without the Boundary Effect:
Theorem 7 (Connectivity of mobile-network
disk model
unit torus
unreliable links). Un-
der condition set Λ in (6) on Page 6, a mobile secure sensor
network with the q-composite scheme and unreliable links
under the disk model on the unit torus without the boundary
effect and under the i.i.d. mobility model is connected with
high probability for at least nc−1−ǫ consecutive time slots
from the beginning for an arbitrary positive constant ǫ, if
1
q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn2 · tn ≥ c lnnn for all n sufficiently large, where
c is a constant with c > 1.
As explained in the result ③ in Section IV-A,
1
q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn2 · tn is an asymptotic value of the edge
probability of mobile-network
disk model
unit torus
unreliable links. Moreover, from
Theorem 3, the conditions in Theorem 7 also ensure that
the corresponding static network static-network
disk model
unit torus
unreliable links is
connected with high probability.
c) Connectivity under the Disk Model on the Square with
the Boundary Effect:
Theorem 8 (Connectivity of mobile-networkdisk modelunit square). Under
condition set Λ in (6) on Page 6, a mobile secure sensor
network with the q-composite scheme under the disk model
on the unit square with the boundary effect and under the
i.i.d. mobility model is connected with high probability for at
least nc−c
∗
n−ǫ consecutive time slots from the beginning for
an arbitrary positive constant ǫ, if 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn2 ≥ c lnnn
for all n sufficiently large, where c is some constant satisfying
c > c∗n for all n sufficiently large, with c
∗
n defined in (20).
As given in the result ② in Section IV-A, 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn2
is asymptotically equivalent to the edge probability of
mobile-networkdisk modelunit square. In addition, from Theorem 4, the
conditions in Theorem 8 also ensure that the corresponding
static network static-networkdisk modelunit square is connected with high
probability.
d) Connectivity with Unreliable Links under the Disk
Model on the Square with the Boundary Effect:
Theorem 9 (Connectivity of mobile-network
disk model
unit square
unreliable links). Un-
der condition set Λ in (6) on Page 6, a mobile secure sensor
network with the q-composite scheme and unreliable links
under the disk model on the unit square with the boundary
effect and under the i.i.d. mobility model is connected with
high probability for at least nc−c
#
n−ǫ consecutive time slots
from the beginning for an arbitrary positive constant ǫ, if
1
q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
·πrn2 · tn ≥ c lnnn for all n sufficiently large, where c
is some constant satisfying c > c#n for all n sufficiently large,
with c#n defined in (21).
As explained in the result ③ in Section IV-A,
1
q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn2 · tn is an asymptotic value of the edge
probability of mobile-network
disk model
unit square
unreliable links. Furthermore, from
Theorem 5, the conditions in Theorem 9 also ensure that
the corresponding static network static-network
disk model
unit square
unreliable links is
connected with high probability.
4) Connectivity under Random Node-Capture Attacks: We
present below the connectivity results under random node-
capture attacks. After the adversary has captured some random
set of m nodes, the remaining network is statistically equiva-
lent to a network initially with (n−m) nodes in the absence
of node capture. Hence, by replacing lnn with ln(n − m),
replacing lnnn with
ln(n−m)
n−m and n with (n − m) in the
connectivity results in Table III, we obtain the connectivity
results in Table IV for an n-size network after the adversary
has captured a random set of m nodes out of all n nodes. Note
that we do not replace the “n” in Kn, Pn, rn, tn.
B. Unsplittability of Secure Sensor Networks with the q-
Composite Scheme
Recall the definition of unsplittability in Section I-B. A
secure sensor network is unsplittable if with high probability
an adversary that has captured an arbitrary set of o(n) sensors
cannot partition the network into two chunks, which both have
linear sizes of sensors, and either are isolated from each other
or only have compromised communications in between.
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Settings Connectivity results under a random capture of m nodes
static/mobile secure sensor
networks under full visibility
connected if 1
q!
· Kn
2q
Pnq
≥
c ln(n−m)
n−m
for any constant c > 1
static
secure
sensor
networks
disk model
torus connected if 1
q!
· Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn
2 ≥
c ln(n−m)
n−m
for any constant c > 1
square connected if 1
q!
· Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn
2 ≥
c ln(n−m)
n−m
for any constant c > c∗n
disk model w/
unreliable links
torus connected if 1
q!
·
Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn
2 · tn ≥
c ln(n−m)
n−m
for any constant c > 1
square connected if 1
q!
· Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn
2 · tn ≥
c ln(n−m)
n−m
for any constant c > c
#
n
mobile
secure
sensor
networks
disk model
torus connected for at least (n−m)c−1−ǫ consecutive time slots if 1
q!
·
Kn
2q
Pnq
·πrn
2≥
c ln(n−m)
n−m
for any constant c > 1
square connected for at least (n−m)c−c
∗
n−ǫ consecutive time slots if 1
q!
·Kn
2q
Pnq
·πrn
2≥
c ln(n−m)
n−m
for any constant c > c∗n
disk model w/
unreliable links
torus connected for at least (n−m)c−1−ǫ consecutive time slots if 1
q!
·Kn
2q
Pnq
·πrn
2·tn≥
c ln(n−m)
n−m
for any constant c > 1
square connected for at least (n−m)c−c
#
n−ǫ consecutive time slots if 1
q!
·Kn
2q
Pnq
·πrn
2·tn≥
c ln(n−m)
n−m
for any constant c > c
#
n
TABLE IV
DIFFERENT SETTINGS OF SECURE SENSOR NETWORKS AND THEIR CONNECTIVITY RESULTS UNDER A RANDOM CAPTURE OF m NODES, WHERE “W/” IS
SHORT FOR “WITH”. NOTE THAT c∗n IS max
{
1 +
(
ln Pn
Kn2
)/
[ln(n−m)], 4
(
ln Pn
Kn2
)/
[ln(n−m)]
}
, c
#
n IS
max
{
1 +
(
q ln Pn
Kn2
+ ln 1
tn
)/
[ln(n−m)], 4
(
q ln Pn
Kn2
+ ln 1
tn
)/
[ln(n−m)]
}
, AND ǫ IS AN ARBITRARY POSITIVE CONSTANT. ALL RESULTS ARE IN
THE ASYMPTOTIC SENSE TO HOLD WITH HIGH PROBABILITY, AND THUS THE CONDITIONS IN THE TABLE ONLY NEED TO HOLD FOR ALL n SUFFICIENTLY
LARGE. EXCEPT THE RESULT UNDER FULL VISIBILITY WHICH REQUIRES CONDITIONS ONKn AND Pn IN CONDITION SET Λ IN (6) ON PAGE 6 BUT NOT
THE CONDITION rn = o(1) IN Λ, ALL OTHER RESULTS NEED THE WHOLE CONDITION SET Λ.
A1 A2
2rn
ℓ 1− ℓ− 2rn
Fig. 2. An adversary that has captured all o(n) nodes in the shaded region
can partition the network into two chunks A1 and A2, which both have linear
sizes of sensors with high probability and are isolated from each other. We
let ℓ be a constant with 0 < ℓ < 1, and consider rn = o(1).
1) Unsplittability under Full Visibility:
Theorem 10. A secure sensor network with the q-composite
scheme under full visibility is unsplittable with high probability
if 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
≥ c lnnn for any constant c > 1, Kn = ω(lnn)
and Kn = o
(
min{√Pn, Pnn }
)
.
By Theorem 1, the conditions in Theorem 10 also ensure
that a secure sensor network with the q-composite scheme
under full visibility is connected with high probability. In-
tuitively, these conditions to guarantee connectivity in the
absence of node capture can also ensure that when o(n) nodes
are compromised, almost all of the remaining nodes are still
securely connected. More formally, the idea to show Theorem
1 is that even if n1 = o(n) nodes are compromised, we
still have a securely connected network consisting of n − n2
nodes, where n2 can also be written as o(n) despite n2 ≥ n1.
The reason for n2 ≥ n1 is that capturing nodes enables
an adversary to compromise communications between non-
captured nodes which happen to use keys that are also shared
by captured nodes.
2) Unsplittability under the Disk Model:
Theorem 11. A static secure sensor network with the q-
composite scheme under the disk model on the unit torus or
unit square is splittable with high probability if rn = o(1).
To explain Theorem 11, Figure 2 illustrates that an adver-
sary capturing all o(n) nodes in the shaded region can partition
the network into two chunks A1 and A2, which both have
linear sizes of sensors with high probability and are isolated
from each other. We present the specific details below for an
intuitive understanding, and provide the technical proofs in
Section VI-E. First, under rn = o(1), we show that the number
of nodes in the shaded region (i.e., a rectangle of width 2rn
and length 1) contains o(n) nodes with high probability since
the area of this region is also o(1). Furthermore, because ℓ in
Figure 2 is a constant with 0 < ℓ < 1, the areas of chunks
A1 and A2 are both constants, which enable us to prove that
each chunk has Θ(n) nodes (i.e., a constant fraction of the n
nodes) with high probability. Finally, it is clear that any node
in region A1 and any node in region A2 have a distance at
least 2rn, so the node set in A1 and the node set in A2 have
no edge in between.
C. Unassailability of Secure Sensor Networks with the q-
Composite Scheme
Many prior studies have analyzed node-captured attacks,
but they often consider that the adversary randomly cap-
tures sensors. However, in practice, the adversary may tune
its node-capture strategy according to its goal. To analyze
unassailability, we consider arbitrary node-capture attacks, in
which the adversary can capture an arbitrary set of sensors.
Recalling the definition of unassailability in Section I-B, a
secure sensor network is unassailable if an adversary that has
captured an arbitrary set of o(n) sensors can compromise
only o(1) fraction of communication links in the rest of
the network; in other words, an adversary has to capture a
constant fraction of sensors to compromise a constant fraction
of communication links. For the q-composite scheme, previous
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studies have considered random node-capture attacks, but not
arbitrary node-capture attacks formally. Hence, no prior work
has rigorously established the parameter conditions under
which secure sensor networks with the q-composite scheme
are unassailable. Our Theorem 12 below presents the condition
for unassailability of the q-composite scheme.
Theorem 12. A secure sensor network with the q-composite
scheme under any communication model is unassailable with
high probability under Pn/Kn = Ω(n).
Under a different setting, a result similar to Theorem 12
is given in [17], [18], but the result of [17], [18] is not for
unassailability which by definition considers arbitrary node-
capture attacks. Specifically, [17], [18] considers only random
node capture where the adversary captures a random set of m
sensors, whereas this paper addresses arbitrary node capture
where the adversary captures an arbitrary set of m sensors.
The choice of m nodes depends on the adversary’s goal and
also physical limitations (e.g., some sensors may be easier to
be captured than others). Theorem 12 is proved in Section
VI-F.
We check the practicality of Pn/Kn = Ω(n) in Theorem
12. Recall that the key ring size Kn denotes the number of
keys in each sensor’s memory and Pn means the key pool
size which the keys on each sensor are selected from. In
real-world sensor networks implementations, Kn is several
orders of magnitude smaller than n due to limited memory
and computational capability of sensors, and Pn is larger than
n [1], [2], [4]. Thus, condition Pn/Kn = Ω(n) is practical.
To find the optimal q that defends against node-capture
attacks, we will investigate how pcompromised changes with
respect to q. Since pcompromised depends on the capture strategy,
to study how pcompromised varies with respect to q, below
we consider the special case where the adversary captures a
random set of m sensors. This has been studied in [17], but
here we will improve the results of [17]. We state the research
question more precisely as follows: given n, if we fix the key
ring size Kn and the key-setup probability pq , and vary q,
the required amount of key overlap, how does the probability
pcompromised change asymptotically with respect to q?
To answer the above question, we first explain the key-setup
probability pq below. In the q-composite scheme, noting that
all sensors’ key rings are random variables following the same
probability distribution, we define the key-setup probability pq
as the probability that the key rings of two sensors have at least
q keys in common. More specifically, with {v1, v2, . . . , vn}
denoting the set of n sensors in the network, and with Rℓ
denoting the key ring of sensor vℓ for ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n, then
we have the same value of P[|Ri ∩ Rj | ≥ q] for each pair of
different i, j since each Rℓ is constructed by selectingKn keys
uniformly at random from the key pool Pn of Pn keys. This
value is denoted by pq . Similarly, given u, we have the same
value of P[|Ri ∩Rj | = u] for each pair of different i, j so we
define ρu as P[|Ri ∩Rj | = u]; i.e., ρu is the probability that
two nodes vi and vj share u keys exactly in their key rings.
Then we have pq = P[|Ri ∩Rj | ≥ q] =
∑Kn
u=q P[|Ri ∩Rj | =
u] =
∑Kn
u=q ρu, where ρu denoting P[|Ri ∩ Rj | = u] can be
computed as follows. After Ri comprising Kn keys is chosen
from the key pool Pn of Pn keys, to have |Ri ∩ Rj | = u
with Rj of Kn keys choosing from Pn, we need to select u
keys from Ri and (Kn − u) keys from Pn \ Ri to construct
Rj , which gives
(
Kn
u
)(
Pn−Kn
Kn−u
)
possibilities of Rj . Without
|Ri ∩Rj | = u, we have
(
Pn
Kn
)
possible ways to find Kn keys
from Pn to form Rj . Given the above, we have
ρu = P[|Ri ∩Rj | = u] =
(
Kn
u
)(
Pn−Kn
Kn−u
)(
Pn
Kn
) (22)
and
pq = P[|Ri ∩Rj | ≥ q] =
Kn∑
u=q
(
Kn
u
)(
Pn−Kn
Kn−u
)(
Pn
Kn
) . (23)
From (23), pq is a function of the parameters Kn, Pn and q.
Hence, to fix pq , the key pool size Pn needs to decrease as q
increases.
We now present Theorem 13 below, which gives the optimal
q that defends against node-capture attacks.
Theorem 13. In a secure sensor network with the q-composite
scheme under any communication model, if the key ring size
Kn and the key-setup probability pq are both fixed, and
conditions Kn = ω(1) and Kn = o
(√
Pn
)
hold, after an
adversary has capturedm sensors with m = o
(√
Pn
Kn2
)
, then
the fraction of communications compromised in the rest of the
network asymptotically achieves its minimum
• at q = 1 if Knm < 2,
• at both q = 1 and q = 2 if Knm = 2,
• at q =
⌊
Kn/m
⌋
if Knm > 2 and Kn/m is not an integer,
and
• at both q = Kn/m and q = (Kn/m)− 1 if Kn/m is an
integer greater than 2.
Theorem 13 improves the result of [17], and is proved in
Section VI-G.
D. Design guidelines for secure sensor networks
Based on our theorems above, we can provide design guide-
lines of secure sensor networks to achieve desired resilience
and connectivity. We first take static-networkdisk modelunit torus as an
example.
From Theorems 2 and 12, for static-networkdisk modelunit torus , to
ensure i) the network is resilient in the sense that an adversary
capturing sensors at random has to obtain at least a constant
fraction of nodes of the network in order to compromise
a constant fraction of secure links, and ii) the network is
connected with high probability, we can enforce Pn/Kn =
Ω(n) and 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn2 ≥ c lnnn with a constant c > 1,
under condition set Λ in (6) on Page 6. We recall that Λ
includes Kn = ω(lnn), Kn = o
(
min
{√
Pn,
Pn
n
})
, and
rn = o(1). Given the above, we can set Kn = c1(lnn)
1+ǫ1
for some c1 and small ǫ1, Pn = c2n(lnn)
1+ǫ2 for some
c2 and ǫ2 > ǫ1. Substituting these Kn and Pn to the
above 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn2 ≥ c lnnn , we can set rn such that
πrn
2 ≥ q!c · c2
q
c12q
· (lnn)1−q(1+2ǫ1−ǫ2)nq−1.
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For static-network
disk model
unit torus
unreliable links, we can still use
Kn and Pn above, while we set rn such that
πrn
2 · tn ≥ q!c · c2
q
c12q
· (lnn)1−q(1+2ǫ1−ǫ2)nq−1, where tn
is the probability of a link being active.
For other networks, similarly we can use our theorems to
present guidelines for setting the network parameters.
V. USEFUL LEMMAS
A. Coupling between random graphs
We will couple different random graphs together. The
idea is converting a problem of one random graph to the
corresponding problem in another random graph, in order to
solve the original problem. Formally, a coupling [28], [44]–
[47] of two random graphs G1 and G2 means a probability
space on which random graphs G′1 and G
′
2 are defined such
that G′1 and G
′
2 have the same distributions as G1 and G2,
respectively. For notation brevity, we simply say G1 is a
spanning subgraph2 (resp., spanning supergraph) of G2 if G
′
1
is a spanning subgraph (resp., spanning supergraph) of G′2.
Using Rybarczyk’s notation [44], we write
G1 G2 (resp., G1 1−o(1) G2) (24)
if there exists a coupling under which G2 is a spanning
subgraph of G1 with probability 1 (resp., 1− o(1)).
Lemma 2 (Rybarczyk [44]). For two random graphs G1 and
G2, the following results hold for any monotone increasing
graph property I.
• If G1  G2, then P
[
G1 has I.
] ≥ P[G2 has I.].
• If G1 1−o(1) G2, then
P
[
G1 has I.
] ≥ P[G2 has I.]− o(1).
Lemma 3 (Rybarczyk [44]). For three random graphs G1, G2
and G3, if G1 1−o(1) G2, then G1 ∩G3 1−o(1) G2 ∩G3.
We useGq(n,Kn, Pn) to represent the graph model induced
by the q-composite key predistribution scheme. In graph
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) defined on n nodes, each node independently
selects Kn different keys uniformly at random from the same
pool of Pn distinct keys, and two nodes establish an edge in
between if and only if they have at least q keys in common.
Also, an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph [48] GER(n, pn) is defined on a
set of n nodes such that any two nodes establish an edge in
between independently with probability pn. Lemma 4 below
relates graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn) with an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph.
Lemma 4. If Kn = ω
(
max{lnn,
√
Pn
n }
)
and Kn =
o
(
min{√Pn, Pnn }
)
, then
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) 1−o(1) GER(n, 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· [1− o(1)]).
(25)
To prove Lemma 4, we introduce an auxiliary graph called
the binomial q-intersection graph Hq(n, sn, Pn) [7], [9], [49],
which can be defined on n nodes by the following process.
There exists a key pool of size Pn. Each key in the pool
2A graph Ga is a spanning subgraph (resp., spanning supergraph) of a
graph Gb if Ga and Gb have the same node set, and the edge set of Ga is
a subset (resp., superset) of the edge set of Gb.
is added to each node independently with probability sn.
After each node obtains a set of keys, two nodes estab-
lish an edge in between if and only if they share at least
q keys. Clearly, the only difference between binomial q-
intersection graph Hq(n, sn, Pn) and uniform q-intersection
graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn) is that in the former, the number of keys
assigned to each node obeys a binomial distribution with Pn
as the number of trials, and with sn as the success probability
in each trial, while in the latter graph, such number equals Kn
with probability 1.
In [36], we prove Lemma 4 by using Lemmas 5 and 6 below.
Lemma 5. If Kn = ω(lnn) and Kn = o
(√
Pn
)
, with sn set
by
sn =
Kn
Pn
(
1−
√
3 lnn
Kn
)
, (26)
then it holds that
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) 1−o(1) Hq(n, sn, Pn). (27)
Lemma 6. If snPn = ω(lnn), nsn = o(1), Pnsn
2 = o(1)
and n2sn
2Pn = ω(1), then there exits some pn satisfying
pn =
(Pnsn
2)q
q! · [1− o(1)] (28)
such that Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph GER(n, pn) [48] obeys
Hq(n, sn, Pn) 1−o(1) GER(n, pn). (29)
B. Useful results in the literature
Lemma 7 (Erdo˝s and Re´nyi [48]). An Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph
GER(n, pn) is connected with high probability if pn ≥ c lnnn
for all n sufficiently large, where c is a constant with c > 1.
The following two lemmas present topological proper-
ties (including connectivity) of graph G(n, pn, rn,A). Graph
G(n, pn, rn,A) is constructed as follows. Let n nodes be
uniformly and independently deployed in some network area
A, which is either a unit torus T or a unit square S. First,
two nodes need to have a distance of no greater than rn for
having an edge in between, which models the transmission
constraints of nodes in wireless networks. Then each edge
between two nodes is preserved with probability pn and
deleted with probability 1−pn, to model the link unreliability
of wireless links.
Lemma 8 (Penrose [50]). The following results hold.
• Under rn = o(1), graphG(n, pn, rn, T ) is connected with
high probability if pn · πrn2 ≥ c lnnn for all n sufficiently
large, where c is a constant with c > 1.
• Under rn = o(1), graph G(n, pn, rn,S) is connected with
high probability if pn · πrn2 ≥ c lnnn for all n sufficiently
large, where c is a constant satisfying c > c∗n, with c
∗
n
defined in (20).
Lemma 9 (Penrose [50]).
• The following results hold in graph G(n, pn, rn, T ) under
rn = o(1).
– The expected number of isolated nodes in graph
G(n, pn, rn, T ) is asymptotically equivalent to
ne−πr
2
npnn.
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– The probability of graph G(n, pn, rn, T ) being dis-
connected is asymptotically equivalent to 1 − e−λ1 ,
where λ1 denotes the expected number of isolated
nodes in graph G(n, pn, rn, T ).
• The following results hold in graph G(n, pn, rn,S) under
rn = o(1).
– The expected number of isolated nodes in graph
G(n, pn, rn,S) is asymptotically equivalent to
ne−πr
2
npnn/c˜n , where
c˜n := max
{
1 +
(
ln 1pn
)/
lnn, 4
(
ln 1pn
)/
lnn
}
.
– The probability of graph G(n, pn, rn,S) being dis-
connected is asymptotically equivalent to 1 − e−λ2 ,
where λ2 denotes the expected number of isolated
nodes in graph G(n, pn, rn,S).
VI. ESTABLISHING THE THEOREMS
A. Establishing Theorem 1
We denote the graph topology of networkfull visibility by
Gq(n,Kn, Pn), which is known as a kind of random inter-
section graph [7], [43] in the literature. Graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn)
is constructed on a node set with size n as follows. Each node
is independently assigned a set of Kn different keys, selected
uniformly at random from a pool of Pn keys. An edge exists
between two nodes if and only if they have at least q keys in
common.
From Lemma 4, there exists a coupling under which
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) is an spanning supergraph of an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi
graph GER(n,
1
q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· [1 − o(1)]) with high probability,
where an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph [48] GER(n, pn) is defined on
a set of n nodes such that any two nodes establish an edge in
between independently with probability pn. Since connectivity
is a monotone increasing graph property3, we obtain from
Lemmas 2 and 4 that
P
[
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) is connected.
]
≥ P[GER(n, 1q! · Kn2qPnq · [1− o(1)]) is connected.]− o(1).
(30)
Given condition 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
≥ c lnnn for all n sufficiently large
with constant c > 1, we use Lemma 7 and have
P
[
GER(n,
1
q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· [1− o(1)]) is connected.] ≥ 1− o(1),
(31)
which is substituted into (30) to derive
P
[
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) is connected.
] ≥ 1− o(1). (32)
Hence, Gq(n,Kn, Pn) is connected with high probability;
namely, networkfull visibility is connected with high probability.
Although the above results can also be derived using the
results in [30], the proof techniques in [30] lack formality
(specifically [30, Equation (6.93)]) and are different from
the above proof. In addition, Bloznelis and Rybarczyk [29]
(resp., Bloznelis and Łuczak [10]) have recently investigated
connectivity (resp., k-connectivity) of networkfull visibility, but
3A graph property is called monotone increasing if it holds under the
addition of edges in a graph.
both results after a rewriting address only the narrow and
impractical range of Pn = o
(
n
1
q (lnn)−
3
5q
)
. In contrast, from
condition set Λ in (6), our Theorem 1 considers a more
practical range of Pn = ω(n lnn). More details can be found
in Section II for related work.
B. Establishing Theorems 2–5
To establish Theorems 2–5, we use an approach similar to
that for proving Theorem 1. Specifically, we will show that
the graph topology of each network in Theorems 2–5 is an
spanning supergraph of some graph G with high probability,
where graph G is connected with high probability under the
corresponding conditions. Since connectivity is a monotone
increasing graph property, we will complete proving Theorems
2–5 by the help of Lemma 2.
For each network on an area A in Theorems 2–5 (A
is the unit torus T or the unit square S), we will show
that its topology is an spanning supergraph of some graph
G(n, pn, rn,A) with high probability. Graph G(n, pn, rn,A)
is constructed as follows. Let n nodes be uniformly and
independently deployed in some network area A, which is
either a unit torus T or a unit square S. First, two nodes need
to have a distance of no greater than rn for having an edge in
between, which models the transmission constraints of nodes
in wireless networks. Then each edge between two nodes is
preserved with probability pn and deleted with probability
1− pn, to model the link unreliability of wireless links.
The disk model induces a so-called random geometric graph
GRGG(n, rn,A), which is defined as follows. Let n nodes be
uniformly and independently deployed in a network area A. An
edge exists between two nodes if and only if their distance is
no greater than rn. With each link inactive with probability tn,
the link unreliability yields an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graphGER(n, tn).
Then it is clear that graph G(n, pn, rn,A) is the intersection4
of random geometric graph GRGG(n, rn,A) and Erdo˝s–Re´nyi
graph GER(n, pn).
Lemma 10. The following results hold under
Kn = ω
(
max{lnn,
√
Pn
n }
)
and Kn = o
(
min{√Pn, Pnn }
)
.
• The graph topology of static-networkdisk modelunit torus is a span-
ning supergraph of G(n, 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· [1− o(1)], rn, T ) with
high probability.
• The graph topology of static-network
disk model
unit torus
unreliable links is a span-
ning supergraph of
G(n, 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· tn · [1−o(1)], rn, T ) with high probability.
• The graph topology of static-networkdisk modelunit square is a span-
ning supergraph of G(n, 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· [1− o(1)], rn,S) with
high probability.
• The graph topology of static-network
disk model
unit square
unreliable links is a span-
ning supergraph of
G(n, 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· tn · [1−o(1)], rn,S) with high probability.
4With two graphs G1 and G2 defined on the same node set, two nodes
have an edge in between in the intersection G1 ∩ G2 if and only if these two
nodes have an edge in G1 and also have an edge in G2.
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1) Proving Theorems 2–5 by Lemmas 8 and 10:
First, we use Lemma 8 to obtain the connectivity results
of different graphs G(n, pn, rn,A) in Lemma 10. Note that if
pn ·πrn2 ≥ c lnnn for some constant c > 1 (resp., c > c∗n), then
pn ·πrn2 · [1−o(1)] ≥ c′ lnnn for all n sufficiently large, where
c′ is any constant satisfying 1 < c′ < c (resp., c∗n < c
′ < c).
Then from Lemma 8, under rn = o(1), we have the following
results.
• Graph G(n, 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· [1− o(1)], rn, T ) is connected with
high probability if 1q! ·Kn
2q
Pnq
·πrn2 ≥ c lnnn for any constant
c > 1.
• Graph G(n, 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· tn · [1− o(1)], rn, T ) is connected
with high probability if 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· tn · πrn2 ≥ c lnnn for
any constant c > 1.
• Graph G(n, 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· [1− o(1)], rn,S) is connected with
high probability if 1q! ·Kn
2q
Pnq
·πrn2 ≥ c lnnn for any constant
c > c∗n.
• Graph G(n, 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· tn · [1− o(1)], rn,S) is connected
with high probability if 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· tn · πrn2 ≥ c lnnn for
any constant c > c#n .
Together with Lemma 10 (we will explain that conditions
in Lemma 10 all hold), the above results complete proving
Theorems 2–5, since any spanning supergraph of a graph that
is connected with high probability is also connected with high
probability.
We now show that conditions in Lemma 10 all hold. First,
condition set Λ in (6) on Page 6 hold in Theorems 2–5, so
we have Kn = ω(lnn), Kn = o
(
min{√Pn, Pnn }
)
and rn =
o(1). Therefore, all conditions in Lemma 10 will hold once we
proveKn = ω
(√
Pn
n
)
. Note that for each of Theorems 2–5, we
always have the condition 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn2 = ω
(
lnn
n
)
, which
along with rn = o(1) yields
Kn
2
Pn
= ω
((
lnn
n
)1/q)
= ω
(
1
n2
)
and thus Kn = ω
(√
Pn
n
)
. 
2) Proof of Lemma 10:
We consider the graph topologies of the networks in Lemma
10 (i.e., those in Theorems 2–5).
First, the q-composite key predistribution scheme is mod-
eled by graph Gq(n,Kn, Pn). The disk model induces the so-
called random geometric graph GRGG(n, rn,A). Finally, in
the presence of link unreliability, since each link is preserved
with probability tn, the underlying graph of link unreliability
is an Erdo˝s–Re´nyi graph GER(n, tn). Therefore, it is straight-
forward to see that the graph topologies of the networks in
Lemma 10 can be viewed as the intersections of different
random graphs. Specifically, we obtain the following:
• The graph topology of network static-networkdisk modelunit torus is
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) ∩GRGG(n, rn, T ).
• The graph topology of network static-network
disk model
unit torus
unreliable links
is Gq(n,Kn, Pn) ∩GRGG(n, rn, T ) ∩GER(n, tn).
• The graph topology of network static-networkdisk modelunit square is
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) ∩GRGG(n, rn,S).
• The graph topology of network static-network
disk model
unit square
unreliable links
is Gq(n,Kn, Pn) ∩GRGG(n, rn,S) ∩GER(n, tn).
From Lemmas 3 and 4, it follows that
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) ∩GRGG(n, rn, T )
1−o(1) G(n, 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· [1− o(1)], rn, T ). (33)
Similarly, we have
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) ∩GRGG(n, rn, T ) ∩GER(n, tn)
1−o(1) G(n, 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· tn · [1− o(1)], rn, T ), (34)
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) ∩GRGG(n, rn,S)
1−o(1) G(n, 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· [1− o(1)], rn,S), (35)
and
Gq(n,Kn, Pn) ∩GRGG(n, rn,S) ∩GER(n, tn)
1−o(1) G(n, 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· tn · [1− o(1)], rn,S). (36)
Then the proof of Lemma 10 is completed. 
C. Establishing Theorems 6–9
On either the torus or the square, we consider i.i.d. mobility
model. Therefore, for all mobile networks that we consider,
the overall node distribution at each time slot is uniform,
although the position of each particular node may change over
time. Then we can view each mobile network at a single time
slot as the corresponding static network. Then we obtain the
following Lemma 11 from Lemma 10.
Lemma 11. The following results hold under Kn =
ω
(
max{lnn,
√
Pn
n }
)
and Kn = o
(
min{√Pn, Pnn }
)
.
• The graph topology of mobile-networkdisk modelunit torus at any time
slot i is a spanning supergraph of
G(n, 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· [1− o(1)], rn, T ) with high probability.
• The graph topology of mobile-networkdisk modelunit square at any time
slot i is a spanning supergraph of
G(n, 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· [1− o(1)], rn,S) with high probability.
• The graph topology of mobile-network
disk model
unit torus
unreliable links at any
time slot i is a spanning supergraph of
G(n, 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· tn · [1−o(1)], rn, T ) with high probability.
• The graph topology of mobile-network
disk model
unit square
unreliable links at any
time slot i is a spanning supergraph of
G(n, 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· tn · [1−o(1)], rn,S) with high probability.
We now use Lemma 11 to demonstrate Theorems 6–9. We
first detail the proof of Theorem 6.
We define Ci as the event that network
mobile-networkdisk modelunit torus at time slot i is connected.
Let λ denote the expected number of isolated nodes in graph
G(n, 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· [1− o(1)], rn, T ). Then from Lemma 9 below,
we have
λ ∼ ne−πr2n· 1q! ·Kn
2q
Pn
q ·n. (37)
Theorem 6 has the following condition:
1
q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· πrn2 ≥ c lnnn for some constant c > 1, (38)
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which yields
ne−πr
2
n· 1q! ·Kn
2q
Pn
q ·n ≤ ne−c lnn = n1−c. (39)
From (37) (39) and c > 1, we obtain
λ ≤ n1−c · [1 + o(1)], (40)
and
λ = o(1). (41)
From Lemma 9, we also have
P
[
G(n, 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
· [1− o(1)], rn, T ) is not connected.
]
=
(
1− e−λ) · [1± o(1)]
≤ 2(1− e−λ), for all n sufficiently large. (42)
Then from (42) and Lemma 11, it follows for all n sufficiently
large that
P[Ci] ≤ 2
(
1− e−λ), for all n sufficiently large, (43)
yielding
P[Ci] ≥ 1−2
(
1−e−λ) ≥ 1−2λ, for all n sufficiently large.
(44)
where the last step uses the inequality 1 − e−x ≤ x for any
real x.
We now bound the probability of event C1 ∩ C2 ∩ · · · ∩ CT
(i.e., the event that mobile-networkdisk modelunit torus is connected for at
least T consecutive time slots from the beginning. Since we
consider the i.i.d. mobility model, the events C1, . . . , CT are
independent. Then we have
P[C1 ∩ C2 ∩ · · · ∩ CT ]
= P[C1]P[C2] · · ·P[CT ]
≥ (1− 2λ)T , (45)
where the last step uses (44).
To evaluate (1−2λ)T , we apply [31, Fact 2] which considers
the Taylor series expansion and have
(1− 2λ)T ≥ 1− 2λT + 12 (2λ)2T 2. (46)
For T = nc−1−ǫ, we use (40) to obtain
λT ≤ n1−c · [1 + o(1)] · nc−1−ǫ = o(1), (47)
which is substituted into (46) to induce
(1− 2λ)T ≥ 1− o(1). (48)
Applying (48) to (45), we establish
P[C1 ∩ C2 ∩ · · · ∩ CT ]→ 1− o(1). (49)
In view of the fact that probability P[C1 ∩ C2 ∩ · · · ∩ CT ] is at
most 1, we obtain from (49) that
P[C1 ∩ C2 ∩ · · · ∩ CT ]→ 1, as n→∞. (50)
Therefore, network mobile-networkdisk modelunit torus is connected for at
least T = nc−1−ǫ consecutive time slots from the beginning.
The proofs of Theorems 7–9 using Lemma 10 are similar
to that of the above proof of Theorem 6. 
D. Proof of Theorem 10
We will prove Theorem 10 by establishing the following:
after an adversary captures m = o(n) nodes, with high
probability there exist n − o(n) non-captured nodes which
form a connected graph using only the non-compromised keys.
In particular, we will show with high probability that there
exist L = n− o(n) non-captured nodes satisfying that ① each
of these L nodes has at least (1 − α)Kn keys that are not
compromised by the adversary, where α = 1 − c− 16q , and ②
these L nodes form a connected graph with each node using
its (1 − α)Kn non-compromised keys to discover neighbors.
We use τ to denote the number of keys compromised by
an adversary that has captured m = o(n) nodes. Clearly, τ ≤
mKn holds. Note that we have Kn = o
(
Pn
n
)
from condition
Kn = o
(
min{√Pn, Pnn }
)
. Let X be the number of a non-
captured node’s keys that are compromised by the adversary.
Since each node has Kn keys selected from a Pn-size pool,
the expected value of X is Kn · τ/Pn. From τ ≤ mKn,
Kn = o
(
Pn
n
)
and m = o(n), it holds that
E[X ] = Kn · τ/Pn = o(Kn). (51)
We define δn as the probability that a non-captured node
has at least αKn keys that are compromised by the adversary.
From Markov’s inequality, it follows that
δn = P[X ≥ αKn] ≤ E[X]αKn ≤ o(α−1) = o(1). (52)
Let Y be the number of non-captured nodes, each of which
has at least (1 − α)Kn keys that are not compromised by
the adversary. For two different non-captured nodes x and y,
independence exists between how the key ring of node x is
compromised by the adversary, and how the the key ring of
node y is compromised by the adversary. Then it is clear that
Y follows a binomial distribution with parameters n−m (the
number of trials) and 1 − δn (the success probability in each
trial). From Hoeffding’s inequality, for any βn, we have
P[Y ≤ (1− δn − βn)(n−m)] ≤ e−2βn
2(n−m). (53)
Setting βn = n
− 13 , we obtain from (53) and m = o(n) that
P[Y ≤ (1− δn − n− 13 )(n−m)] ≤ e−2n
−
2
3 (n−m) = o(1).
(54)
Therefore, with L denoting (1− δn − n− 13 )(n−m), we get
P[Y ≥ L] ≥ 1− o(1). (55)
From (52) and m = o(n), it holds that
L = (1− δn − n− 13 )(n−m) = n− o(n). (56)
Clearly, (55) and (56) above prove the result ① mentioned
at the beginning of the proof; i.e., each of these L = n− o(n)
nodes has at least (1− α)Kn keys that are not compromised
by the adversary.
Now we show the result ②. We use Theorem 1 to show that
the L nodes form a connected graph with each node using its
(1−α)Kn non-compromised keys to discover neighbors. From
Theorem 1, we need to have (i) (1 − α)Kn = ω(lnn) and
(1 − α)Kn = o
(
min
{√
Pn,
Pn
n
})
, which both clearly hold
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY 17
from the conditions of Theorem 10, and (ii) 1q! · [(1−α)Kn]
2q
Pnq
≥
c˜ · lnLL for some constant c˜ > 1, which we prove below.
As mentioned, α equals 1− c− 16q . We choose this value of
α since it leads to
1
q! · [(1−α)Kn]
2q
Pnq
= c−
1
3 · 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
. (57)
From (56), we have L ∼ n so that lnLL ∼ lnnn , which along
with c > 1 yields for all n sufficiently large that
lnL
L ≤ c
1
3 · lnnn . (58)
Then from (57) (58) and condition 1q! ·Kn
2q
Pnq
≥ c lnnn , we obtain
for all n sufficiently large that
1
q! · [(1−α)Kn]
2q
Pnq
≥ c− 13 · c lnnn ≥ c
1
3 · lnLL . (59)
Thus we can choose constant c˜ = c
1
3 > 1 to have 1q! ·
[(1−α)Kn]2q
Pnq
≥ c˜ · lnLL for all n sufficiently large. Then as
explained above, result ② is proved from Theorem 1.
In view of results ① and ②, after an adversary captures
m = o(n) nodes, with high probability, there exist n − o(n)
non-captured nodes, which form a connected graph using only
the non-compromised keys. Therefore, with high probability,
an adversary that has captured an arbitrary set of o(n) sensors
cannot partition the network into two chunks, which both
have linear sizes of sensors, and either are isolated from each
other or only have compromised communications in between.
Then the studied secure sensor network with the q-composite
scheme under full visibility is unsplittable. 
E. Proof of Theorem 11
We show that under the disk model, an adversary that has
captured some set of o(n) sensors can partition the network
into two chunks, which both have linear sizes of sensors with
high probability and are isolated from each other.
As shown in Figure 3-(a) (Figure 3-(b) is explained later),
the adversary captures all nodes in the shaded region A0,
which has a width 2rn and a length 1. The region A1 on
the left side of the shaded region has a width ℓ and a length
1, while the region A2 on the right side of the shaded area
has a width 1− ℓ− 2rn and a length 1, where ℓ is a constant
with 0 < ℓ < 1.
With |Ai| denoting the area of Ai for each i = 0, 1, 2, we
have |A0| = 2rn = o(1), |A1| = ℓ = Θ(1) and |A2| =
1− ℓ− 2rn = Θ(1). Therefore, to show the number of nodes
in A0 is o(n) with high probability, and the numbers of nodes
in A1 and A2 are both Θ(n) with high probability, it suffices
to prove the following: for some region A˜ as a sub-field of the
whole network region A, with |A˜| denoting the area of A˜ and
with N˜ denoting the number of nodes in region A˜, we have ❶
if |A˜| = o(1), then N˜ = o(n) holds with high probability, and
❷ if |A˜| = Θ(1), then N˜ = Θ(n) holds with high probability.
Since all n nodes are uniformly distributed in the whole
network region A with area 1 (A is a unit torus or a unit
square), then N˜ (the number of nodes in the region A˜) follows
a binomial distribution with parameter n as the number of
(a) (b)
A1 A2
2rn
ℓ 1− ℓ− 2rn
Fig. 1. An adversary captures all nodes in the shaded region.
a length , while the region on the right side of the shaded area has a width and a length , where
is a constant with < ℓ <
With |A denoting the area of for each = 0 , we have |A = 2 (1) |A = Θ(1) and
|A = 1 = Θ(1). Therefore, to show the number of nodes in is with high probability, and the
numbers of nodes in and are both Θ( with high probability, it suffices to prove the following: for some
region as a sub-field of the whole network region , with A| denoting the area of and with denoting
the number of nodes in region , we have if A| (1), then holds with high probability, and if
A| = Θ(1), then = Θ( holds with high probability.
Since all nodes are uniformly distributed in the whole network region with area is a unit torus or a
unit square), then (the number of nodes in the region ) follows a binomial distribution with parameter as the
number of trials, and parameter A| as the success probability in each trial. For any , we use Hoeffding’s
inequality to have
[( A| − A| (58)
Setting , we have (1). Then
[( A| − A| (1) (59)
Then we have
if A| (1), then A| holds with high probability.
if A| = Θ(1), it holds with high probability that A| − A| . From A| = Θ(1) and
, both A| − and A| are Θ( . Therefore, = Θ( follows with high probability.
Th refore, the results and above are proved. Returning to Figure 1-(a), as explained before, in view of
|A (1) |A = Θ(1) and |A = Θ(1), we obtain the following: with denoting the number of nodes in
region for each = 0 , we have with high probability, = Θ( with high probability, and
= Θ( with high probability. Then = Θ( = Θ( occurs with probability
(1) by the union bound. Hence, = Θ( = Θ( holds with high probability.
28
Fig. 3. An adversary captures all nodes in the shaded region.
trials, and parameter |A˜| as the success probability in each
trial. For any νn > 0, we use Hoeffding’s inequality to have
P[(|A˜| − νn)n ≤ N˜ ≤ (|A˜|+ νn)n] ≥ 1− 2e−2νn
2n. (60)
Setting νn = n
− 13 , we have 2e−2νn
2n = o(1). Then
P[(|A˜| − νn)n ≤ N˜ ≤ (|A˜|+ νn) ] ≥ 1− o(1). (61)
Then we have
• if |A˜| = o(1), then N˜ ≤ (|A˜|+ νn)n = o(n) holds with
high probability.
• if |A˜| = Θ(1), it holds with high probability that
(|A˜| − νn)n ≤ N˜ ≤ (|A˜| + νn)n. From |A˜| = Θ(1) and
νn = n
− 13 , both (|A˜| − νn)n and (|A˜|+ νn)n are Θ(n).
Therefore, N˜ = Θ(n) follows with high probability.
Therefore, the results ❶ and ❷ above are proved. Returning
to Figure 3-(a), as explained before, in view of |A0| = o(1),
|A1| = Θ(1) and |A2| = Θ(1), we obtain the following:
with Ni denoting th number of nodes in region Ai for
each i = 0, 1, 2, we have N0 = o(n) with high probability,
N1 = Θ(n) with high probability, and N2 = Θ(n) with high
probability. Then
{
N0 = o(n)
} ∩ {N1 = Θ(n)} ∩ {N2 =
Θ(n)
}
occurs with probability 1 − o(1) by the union bound.
Hence,
{
N0 = o(n)
} ∩ {N1 = Θ(n)} ∩ {N2 = Θ(n)} holds
with high probability.
From Figure 3-(a), it is clear that any node in region A1 and
any node in regionA2 have a distance at least 2rn, so the node
set in region A1 and the node set in region A2 have no edge in
between. Hence, with high probability, an adversary that has
captured o(n) nodes in region N0 partitions the network into
two chunks, which both have linear sizes of sensors and are
isolated from each other. Then the studied static secure sensor
network with the q-composite scheme under the disk model
on the unit torus or unit square is splittable. 
Remarks:
• The adversary may split the network into multiple chunks
instead of just two, as illustrated in Figure 3-(b).
• future direction is to extended the result to more general
topology (here we consider a torus or square).
F. Proof of Theorem 12
We will prove Theorem 12 by showing that under Pn/Kn =
Ω(n), an adversary that has captured an arbitrary set of o(n)
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sensors can only compromise o(1) fraction of communication
links in the rest of the network.
Suppose the adversary has captured some set of m nodes.
The choice of m nodes depends on the adversary’s goal and
also physical limitations (e.g., some sensors may be easier
to be captured than others). Let Eτ be the event that the m
captured nodes have τ different keys in their key rings in
total. It is clear that Kn ≤ τ ≤ min{mKn, Pn}. Recall that
pcompromised is the fraction of compromised communications
among non-captured nodes (pcompromised is also the probability
that the secure link between two non-captured nodes is com-
promised). Conditioning on event Eτ , let pcompromised(τ) be the
fraction of compromised communications among non-captured
nodes (conditioning on event Eτ , pcompromised(τ) is also the
probability that the secure link between two non-captured
nodes is compromised). By the law of total probability, we
have
pcompromised =
∑min{mKn,Pn}
τ=Kn
{
P[Eτ ] · pcompromised(τ)
}
. (62)
The adversary’s node capture strategy determines P[Eτ ].
With Kn ≤ τ ≤ min{mKn, Pn}, it holds that∑min{mKn,Pn}
Kn
P[Eτ ] = 1. Clearly, as τ increases,
pcompromised(τ) increases (of course, if τ reaches Pn,
pcompromised(τ) becomes 1 and can not increase anymore). With
Kn ≤ τ ≤ min{mKn, Pn}, then pcompromised(τ) achieves
its maximum when τ = min{mKn, Pn}. Therefore, for an
adversary that has captured any set of m sensors, it is simple
to derive from (62) that
pcompromised ≤ pcompromised(min{mKn, Pn}). (63)
Under Pn/Kn = Ω(n) and m = o(n), it holds that
mKn = o(Pn). (64)
Then we have mKn ≤ Pn and thus min{mKn, Pn} = mKn
for all n sufficiently large, which is used in (63) to derive
pcompromised ≤ pcompromised(mKn). (65)
In addition, to maximize pcompromised as pcompromised(mKn), the
adversary can capture some set ofm sensors which havemKn
different keys in their key rings in total. Therefore, given (65),
the proof of Theorem 12 is completed once we demonstrate
pcompromised(mKn) = o(1).
By Yum and Lee [51], it follows that
pcompromised(τ) =
∑Kn
u=q
[
(τu)
(Pnu )
· ρupq
]
, (66)
where the expressions of ρu and pq are given in (22) and (23).
To compute pcompromised(mKn), we look at pcompromised(τ)
given in (66). Then we bound the term
(
τ
u
)/(
Pn
u
)
in (66).
With q ≤ u ≤ Kn, we obtain(
τ
u
)/(
Pn
u
) ≤ τu/(u!)(Pn−u)u/(u!) ≤ τq(Pn−Kn)q , (67)
which along with
∑Kn
u=q ρu = pq is used in (66) to yield
pcompromised(τ) ≤
∑Kn
u=q
[
τq
(Pn−Kn)q ·
ρu
pq
]
= τ
q
(Pn−Kn)q . (68)
Setting τ as mKn, we have
pcompromised(mKn) ≤ (mKn)
q
(Pn−Kn)q = o(1), (69)
where the last step uses mKn = o(Pn − Kn), which holds
from (64). 
G. Proof of Theorem 13
Note that different from the case of Theorem 12, in Theorem
13 here, we do not havemKn ≤ Pn for all n sufficiently large.
Hence, we can have (63) only, instead of having (65).
When the adversary captures m nodes randomly, P[Eτ ] is
non-zero for all τ satisfying Kn ≤ τ ≤ min{mKn, Pn}.
Under this random attack, the computation of pcompromised
is not that straightforward. Yet, [17] presents an asymptotic
expression of pcompromised as Lemma 12 below.
Lemma 12. If the adversary capturesm nodes randomly with
m = o
(√
Pn
Kn2
)
, then pcompromised is asymptotically equivalent
to
(
mKn
Pn
)q
under Kn = ω(1) and Kn = o
(√
Pn
)
.
From Lemma 12, it holds that
pcompromised ∼
(
mKn
Pn
)q
. (70)
Under Kn = ω(1) and Kn = o
(√
Pn
)
, as given in (18),
we have pq ∼ 1q! · Kn
2q
Pnq
, which with (70) above induces
pcompromised
pq
∼ (mKnPn )q · q! · PnqKn2q = q!( mKn )q = f(q), (71)
where f(q) is defined by
f(q) = q!
(
m
Kn
)q
. (72)
We now analyze how f(q) changes as q varies, to understand
the asymptotic behavior of pcompromised. From (72), we compute
f(q + 1)/f(q) through
f(q+1)
f(q) =
m(q+1)
Kn
. (73)
Then using (73) to analyze the monotonicity of f(q), we
finally establish Theorem 13.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
We now provide simulation results to confirm the theoretical
findings. All plots in the paper are obtained from simulation.
Specifically, in each plot, the data points are obtained by
averaging over 500 independent network samples.
A. Simulation Results for Connectivity
We present below simulation results of connectivity in
secure sensor networks to confirm the theorems. Figure 4
depicts the probability that network static-networkdisk modelunit torous is
connected with q = 2. We vary the key ring size K , and set
n = 2000, P = 5000, and r = 0.2, 0.3. For each pair (K, r),
we generate 500 independent samples of Gq(n,K, P, r, T ) and
record the count that the obtained graph has connectivity. Then
we derive the empirical probabilities after dividing the counts
by 500. Similarly, in Figure 5, we plot the probability that
network static-network
disk model
unit square
unreliable links is connected after an adver-
sary captures 10 random nodes, for q = 2, n = 1000, 900, 800,
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Fig. 4. A plot of the empirical probability that network static-networkdisk modelunit torous
is connected as a function of the key ring size K with q = 2, n = 2000,
P = 5000, and r = 0.2, 0.3.
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Fig. 5. A plot of the empirical probability that network
static-network
disk model
unit square
unreliable links
after the random capture of 10 nodes is connected
as a function of the key ring size K with q = 2, n = 1000, 900, 800,
P = 5000, r = 0.3 and t = 0.9.
P = 5000, r = 0.3 and t = 0.9. As illustrated in both figures,
we observe the transitional behavior of connectivity. Moreover,
for both Figure 4 and 5, substituting the parameter values into
the corresponding theorems of this paper, we can confirm the
correctness of the theorems.
Figure 6 presents a plot of the empirical probability that
mobile network mobile-networkdisk modelunit square is connected for at
least T consecutive time slots as a function of the key ring
size with q = 2, n = 1000, P = 6000, r = 0.25 and
K = 44, 50, 60. We consider the i.i.d. mobility model, where
each node independently picks a new location uniformly at
random at the beginning of a time slot and stays at the location
in the rest of the time slot. At each time slot, we check
whether the network is connected. We generate 500 indepen-
dent samples and record the count that mobile-networkdisk modelunit square
is connected for at least T consecutive time slots. Then we
derive the empirical probabilities after dividing the counts
by 500. As illustrated in Figure 6, incrementing K increases
the probability that mobile network mobile-networkdisk modelunit square is
connected for at least T consecutive time slots.
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Fig. 6. A plot of the empirical probability that mobile network
mobile-networkdisk modelunit square is connected for at least T consecutive time slots
as a function of the key ring size with q = 2, n = 1000, P = 6000,
r = 0.25 and K = 44, 50, 60.
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Fig. 7. A plot of probability pcompromised of link compromise with respect to
q, under K = 40, pq = 0.1 and m = 15, 40. To ensure a fixed pq , the key
pool size P needs to decrease as q increases.
B. Simulation Results for Unassailability
We provide simulation plots below for a comparison with
the theoretical results above.
1) Varying q with key ring size and key-setup prob. fixed:
We first fix the key ring size and the key-setup probability,
and vary q to see how the probability pcompromised of link
compromise changes.
Figure 7 depicts probability pcompromised with respect to q. We
fix the key ring size at K = 40, and the key-setup probability
at pq = 0.1, and set the number m of captured nodes as 15 or
40. As illustrated, for m = 15, as q increases, pcompromised first
decreases and then increases; and for m = 40, as q increases,
pcompromised always increases. These are in agreement with the
analytical results. In particular, for K = 40 and m = 15,
given Km =
40
15 ≈ 2.67 and Theorem 13, pcompromised takes its
minimum at q = 2, in accordance with the fact that in Figure
7, pcompromised for m = 15 achieves its minimum at q = 2. For
K = 40 and m = 40, both both theoretical and experimental
results show that pcompromised takes the minimum at q = 2.
In Figure 8, we plot the relation between q and the number
m of sensors that the adversary needs to capture to compro-
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Fig. 8. A plot under varying q for the number m of nodes that the
adversary has to capture to compromise a link between two non-captured
nodes with probability pcompromised. The parameters are K = 40, pq = 0.1
and pcompromised = 0.03, 0.1. To fix pq , the key pool size P decreases as q
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Fig. 9. A plot of probability pcompromised of link compromise with respect
to m, under K = 50, P = 10000 and q = 2, 3. Note that the key-setup
probability here is different for different q.
mise a link between two non-captured nodes with probability
pcompromised. We also fix the key ring size at K = 40, and
the key-setup probability at pq = 0.1, and set pcompromised as
0.03 or 0.1. The curves on how m changes with respect to
q also confirm the analytical results as explained below. As
mentioned, for small m, as q increases, pcompromised asymp-
totically first decreases and then increases. Hence, if we fix
a small pcompromised, as q increases, the required m should
first increase and then decrease. This clearly is validated
by the curve of pcompromised = 0.03 in Figure 8. Similarly,
the theoretical result shows that for large m, as q increases,
pcompromised asymptotically always increases. Thus, if we fix a
large pcompromised, as q increases, the requiredm should always
decrease. This is validated by the curve of pcompromised = 0.1
in Figure 8.
2) Varying m with key ring size and key pool size fixed:
We now fix both the key ring size and the key pool size, and
varym (the number of nodes captured by the adversary) to see
how the probability pcompromised of link compromise changes
with respect to m.
Figure 9 depicts probability pcompromised with respect to m.
We fix the key ring size at K = 50, and the key pool size at
P = 10000, and set q (the required amount of key overlap)
as 2 or 3. Clearly, for each q, we observe that pcompromised
increases asm increases. In addition, as we see, for very small
m, probability pcompromised under q = 2 is larger than that under
q = 3. We explain below that this confirms the theoretical
result. By analysis, for small m and small q, as q increases,
pcompromised asymptotically decreases. Therefore, for small m,
pcompromised under q = 2 is asymptotically larger than that under
q = 3, which is in agreement with Figure 9. By analysis, for
large m, as q increases, pcompromised asymptotically increases.
This is validated since we see in Figure 9 that for large m,
pcompromised under q = 2 is small than that under q = 3.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In wireless sensor networks, the q-composite key predistri-
bution scheme is a widely studied mechanism to secure com-
munications. Despite considerable studies on secure sensor
networks under the q-composite scheme, most of them ignore
one or more than one of the following aspects: node-capture
attacks, sensor mobility, physical transmission constraints,
the boundary effect of network fields, and link unreliability,
whereas we consider all of them in this paper and present con-
ditions to ensure secure connectivity. Moreover, few researches
on the q-composite scheme formally analyze the scheme’s
resilience to arbitrary node-capture attacks considered in this
paper, where the adversary can capture an arbitrary set of
sensors. In the presence of arbitrary node-capture attacks, we
derive conditions to ensure unassailability and unsplittability
in secure sensor networks under the q-composite scheme.
This paper presents a rigorous and comprehensive analysis
to provide useful guidelines for connectivity and resilience
design of secure sensor networks.
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